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EXECUTIVE ACTION AND NONACTION* 
TOM CAMPBELL** 
Executive action and nonaction should be amenable to judgment 
by federal courts, distinguishing unlawful from permissible 
discretion. Previous commentators have been largely skeptical of 
standing for Congress to challenge executive action and 
nonaction, but most of that commentary preceded the Supreme 
Court’s revival of legislator standing last term in Arizona State 
Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, 
and the Court’s recent invitation in the order granting certiorari 
in United States v. Texas (affirmed by an equally divided court) 
to consider the meaning of the President’s obligation to take care 
that the laws be faithfully executed. Problems a court might 
encounter in crafting an effective injunctive remedy in the context 
of executive nonaction can be overcome by seeking declaratory 
judgment relief. Legislators’ interests are of two types: to see laws 
they enacted enforced and to overcome impediments to their 
legislative functions. The former interest should be sufficient to 
justify legislators’ standing if the current Congress at the time of a 
lawsuit announces its support for enforcement of a law by 
authorizing litigation. The second kind of legislator interest can 
be found under the specific constitutional power of 
impeachment, exercised by the House of Representatives. This 
interest is present even if the House does not take a vote on 
impeachment, just as the Congress’ oversight authority exists 
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apart from an actual vote on a bill. Involving the judicial branch 
in challenges to executive action and nonaction cases has 
functional advantages, including providing the executive with a 
potentially face-saving premise to change a previous approach to 
enforcement or nonenforcement. Following a court 
determination, the House Judiciary Committee, through its 
impeachment authority, would serve as the monitor of whether 
such a change of approach has taken place. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The concept of executive action involves matters within the 
exclusive authority of the President which the President has the right 
to decide, matters where the President encroaches on the exclusive 
authority of the Congress, and matters for which responsibility is 
shared between the President and Congress. It involves both action 
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and inaction by the President. This Article adds to recent literature by 
developing, contrary to the approach of other commentators,1 a 
theory for judicial involvement in setting the proper bounds between 
the executive and legislative branches. There are well-established 
means for a court to determine whether an executive action or 
inaction is lawful, and this Article offers specific drafting suggestions 
for Congress to enhance the likelihood of having such questions 
heard by a court. 
Executive action has been an issue from the earliest days of our 
country, though recent years have presented an increasing set of 
examples.2 The more recent controversies include President Obama 
commencing military involvement in Libya in 2011 for 222 days 
without congressional authorization;3 bombing in Syria, starting in 
2014 and continuing without congressional authorization;4 refusing to 
 
 1. See, e.g., Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama 
Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take 
Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 784–86 (2013) (arguing that in certain circumstances, 
executive nonenforcement is a constitutional wrong for which there is no “judicial or 
political” remedy); Neal Devins & Saikrishna Prakash, The Indefensible Duty to Defend, 
112 COLUM. L. REV. 507, 517 n.49 (2012); Jeffrey A. Love & Arpit K. Garg, Presidential 
Inaction and the Separation of Powers, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1195, 1201–03, 1227–30, 1244–45 
(2014) (arguing that judicial remedy for executive inaction is inadequate, and favoring 
stronger congressional involvement in proving a checks and balances approach); William 
P. Marshall, Actually We Should Wait: Evaluating the Obama Administration’s 
Commitment to Unilateral Executive-Branch Action, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 773, 779 (2014) 
(arguing that separation-of-powers constraints on the President remain constant despite 
the political polarization of Congress); Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and 
Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 680–84 (2014) (advocating for congressional 
involvement in the executive’s decision not to act); Nat Stern, The Indefinite Deflection of 
Congressional Standing, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 1–3 (2015) (arguing that congressional 
standing is the best way to defend against executive action and inaction). All but the 
Devins and Prakash article preceded the revival of legislator standing last term in the 
Supreme Court decision in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting 
Commission, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2663–66 (2015). Suits by legislators constitute an important 
category of judicial enforcement of the separation of powers between the executive and 
legislative branches that this Article develops. See, e.g., Michael Sant’Ambrogio, Standing 
in the Shadow of Popular Sovereignty, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1869, 1872 n.6 (2015). 
 2. Dino P. Christenson & Douglas L. Kriner, Political Constraints on Unilateral 
Executive Action, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 897, 901–03 (2015); see also Price, supra note 
1, at 673–74. 
 3. See Barack Obama, Letter from President Barack Obama to the Speaker of the 
House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate Regarding the War 
Powers Resolution, WHITE HOUSE (Dec. 15, 2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/12/15/letter-president-speaker-house-representatives-and-president-pro-tempore 
[https://perma.cc/C9AB-5BAB]. U.S. military action commenced on March 19, 2011, and 
ceased on October 27, 2011. See id. 
 4. Tanya Somanader, President Obama Delivers a Statement on Airstrikes in Syria, 
WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 23, 2014, 10:38 AM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/09/23
95 N.C. L. REV. 553 (2017) 
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deport categories of aliens who are illegally in the United States5 and 
granting three-year work permits to persons in those categories;6 
declining to prosecute marijuana possession cases in states that have 
legalized private possession of marijuana with a strong state 
regulatory system;7 suspending the employer mandate under the new 
health insurance law for the year 2014;8 suspending the individual 
mandate for those who lost their health insurance coverage in 2014;9 
permitting expanded categories of Medicaid financing for low income 
persons in states that did not set up exchanges;10 appointing members 
to the National Labor Relations Board during what the President, but 
not the Senate, considered a congressional recess;11 refusing to print 
“Israel” as the birthplace of American citizens born in Jerusalem on 
their U.S. passports, though a statute required it;12 and announcing a 
policy of nonenforcement of the sanctions regime imposed upon Iran, 
in connection with Iran’s agreement regarding its nuclear capability.13 
 
/president-obama-delivers-statement-airstrikes-syria [https://perma.cc/UK98-YVGY]. See 
Christenson & Kriner, supra note 2, at 927. 
 5. Alejandro Mayorkas, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals: Who Can Be 
Considered?, WHITE HOUSE (Aug. 15, 2012, 11:55 AM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog
/2012/08/15/deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-who-can-be-considered [https://perma.cc
/JX42-XUGR]; Executive Actions on Immigration, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION 
SERVS. (Apr. 15, 2015), https://www.uscis.gov/immigrationaction [https://perma.cc/A3YK-
NG5A]. 
 6. Executive Actions on Immigration, supra note 5. 
 7. See Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to 
All U.S. Att’ys (Aug. 29, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources
/3052013829132756857467.pdf [https://perma.cc/7G7B-ZT4U]. 
 8. I.R.S. Notice 2013-45, 2013-31 I.R.B. 116 (July 29, 2013). See Price, supra note 1, 
at 752. 
 9. OPTIONS AVAILABLE FOR CONSUMERS WITH CANCELLED POLICIES, CTRS. FOR 
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (2013), https://
www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-and-Guidance/Downloads/cancellation-
consumer-options-12-19-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/NBG3-UD4R]. See Price, supra note 
1, at 750.  
 10. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2487 (2015) (“The IRS addressed the availability 
of tax credits by promulgating a rule that made them available on both State and Federal 
Exchanges. As relevant here, the IRS Rule provides that a taxpayer is eligible for a tax 
credit if he enrolled in an insurance plan through ‘an Exchange,’ which is defined as ‘an 
Exchange serving the individual market	.	.	.	regardless of whether the Exchange is 
established and operated by a State	.	.	.	or by HHS[.]’	”) (first quoting 26 C.F.R. §	1.36B–2 
(2013); then quoting 45 C.F.R. §	155.20 (2014); and then citing 77 Fed. Reg. 30,377, 30,378 
(2012)). 
 11. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2557 (2014). 
 12. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-228, 
§	214(d), 116 Stat. 1350, 1366. See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 
1425 (2012). 
 13. President Barack Obama, Statement by the President on Iran (July 14, 2015), in 
WHITE HOUSE, THE IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE 
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Earlier examples of executive action involved significant 
controversy. These included President Truman’s seizure of America’s 
steel mills during the Korean War;14 President Nixon’s impoundment 
of funds authorized and appropriated by Congress;15 President 
Franklin Roosevelt’s sale of U.S. warships to Great Britain in return 
for leases on British territories in the Western Hemisphere, despite a 
congressional requirement of neutrality before America entered 
World War II;16 President Franklin Roosevelt’s extinguishing of 
claims of American citizens against the Soviet Union, as an effort to 
normalize relations with USSR;17 President Reagan’s invasion of 
Grenada without congressional authorization;18 President George 
H.W. Bush’s invasion of Panama without Congressional 
authorization;19 and President Clinton’s bombing of Yugoslavia for 
seventy-nine days in 1999 without congressional authorization.20 
As evidenced by these examples, controversial executive action 
and nonaction can be drawn from both international and domestic 
contexts.21 
The structure of Justice Jackson’s famous concurrence in the 
Steel Seizure22 case forms the outline for this Article’s consideration 
 
JCPOA, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/jcpoa_what_you_need
_to_know.pdf [https://perma.cc/TS2X-6QYX]. 
 14. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 582 (1952). 
 15. Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 40 (1975). 
 16. This use of executive power is aptly described by the passage that follows:  
Then on September 3 [, 1940,] it was announced that the United States had 
entered into an agreement under which, in return for the lease of certain sites for 
naval bases in the British west Atlantic, our government had handed over to 
Britain fifty overage destroyers which had been recently reconditioned and 
recommissioned. Although the transaction was directly violative of a least two 
statutes and represented an exercise by the President of a power which by the 
Constitution is specifically assigned to Congress, it was defended by Attorney 
General, now Justice, Jackson as resting on the power of the President as 
Commander-in-Chief to ‘dispose’ the armed forces of the United States which was 
ingeniously, if not quite ingenuously, construed as the power to ‘dispose of’ them! 
 EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE AND POWERS 288–89 (3d ed. 1948) 
(footnote omitted). 
 17. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 326–27 (1937). 
 18. U.S. Relations with Grenada Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Nov. 10, 2015), 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2335.htm [https://perma.cc/5NS4-5BDJ]. 
 19. U.S. Relations with Panama Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (July 29, 2015), 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2030.htm [https://perma.cc/PG7J-5G2P]. 
 20. See Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 21. For more examples from the Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush 
administrations, see Zachary S. Price, Politics of Nonenforcement, 65 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 1119, 1125–33 (2015). 
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of executive action: Within the Constitution, there are areas uniquely 
committed to the executive branch, areas uniquely committed to the 
legislative branch, and areas of shared authority. Part I discusses the 
areas of exclusive authority to the President and Part II discusses the 
areas of exclusive authority to the legislative branch. After a brief 
consideration of the first two areas, this Article, in Part III, devotes 
most attention to the third: where legislative and executive authority 
overlap. Under that heading, the area of most interest is where 
Congress has passed a law, but the President chooses not to enforce 
it. Part IV addresses the question of which remedies are available in 
that circumstance and concludes that, among other possible remedies, 
declaratory judgment relief would cover the broadest range of 
circumstances and would satisfy federal court justiciability 
requirements. Part V next considers who would have standing to 
bring such an action. Private parties who were aggrieved would 
certainly qualify, but they would not be present in many cases. Thus, 
the issue of legislative standing is presented. The Supreme Court has 
very recently confirmed its standard for legislative standing, in a 
phrasing that would support legislative branch standing either to sue 
to compel the executive branch to enforce the law, or at least to 
obtain a declaratory judgment that the President’s failure to enforce 
the law was indefensible. The premise for legislative standing in such 
a legal action is bolstered by reference to the specific power of 
impeachment, given to the House of Representatives, even if formal 
impeachment proceedings are not commenced. The resort to judicial 
remedies should lead to less confrontational means of resolving 
interbranch disputes with the enhanced possibility of face-saving 
withdrawals by each branch from an extreme position. A brief 
conclusion follows. 
I.  INHERENTLY EXCLUSIVE AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT 
Among the most common assertions of inherent power by the 
President have been those under his commander-in-chief authority, 
such as initiating the use of America’s armed forces in the absence of 
a congressional declaration of war, and especially asserting power in 
regard to the President’s conduct of a war once declared.23 
 
 22. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 635–37 
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
23. The power given to the President once war is declared is quite broad: 
A declaration of war didn’t tell the president how to fight the enemy, or how 
vigorously, or even when to begin: All it did was declare that we were at war with 
95 N.C. L. REV. 553 (2017) 
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Nevertheless, challenges to the President’s assertion of inherent 
authority in this realm date to the earliest days of our country. 
President George Washington announced a policy of neutrality in the 
war between France and Great Britain; then-Congressman James 
Madison challenged his right to do so, since, he argued, the closest 
analogous power was the right to declare war, and that was vested 
exclusively in the Congress.24 Alexander Hamilton defended the 
President’s inherent rights in a manner that Madison characterized as 
monarchical—in a literal sense—Hamilton, he claimed, had to derive 
the President’s inherent rights from the powers the United States 
inherited from the British Crown, which inhered in the President 
unless specifically granted to Congress25: 
Washington’s so-called “Proclamation of Neutrality” upon the 
outbreak early in 1793 of war between France and Great 
Britain	.	.	.	declared the intention of the United States to 
“pursue a course friendly and impartial to both belligerent 
powers’	.	.	.	. In brief, Hamilton’s argument comprises the 
following contentions: first, that the opening clause of Article II 
is a grant of power; secondly, that the succeeding more specific 
grants of the article, except when ‘coupled with express 
restrictions or limitation,” “specify the principal articles” 
implied in the general grant and hence serve to interpret it; 
thirdly—by inference—that the direction of foreign policy is 
inherently an “executive” function.	.	.	.	[Madison] proceeds to 
charge Hamilton with seeking to annex to the Presidency the 
prerogative of the British Crown.	.	.	.	Madison’s own theory is 
that the right to determine the foreign policy of the United 
States devolves upon Congress by virtue of its power to declare 
war.26 
The inherent rights of the Presidency prevail not only where 
Congress is silent, as it was at the time of President Washington’s 
 
one or more enemies and leave the “how” up to him. Indeed, had it done more 
than that it would at least have flirted with unconstitutionality, as it was the point 
of the Commander in Chief Clause to keep Congress out of day-to-day combat 
decisions once it had authorized the war in question. 
JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM 
AND ITS AFTERMATH 25 (1993) (footnote omitted). See also id. at 142–43 n.22. 
 24. See CORWIN, supra note 16, at 217–19. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. (citations omitted). 
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Proclamation of Neutrality,27 but also when Congress attempts to 
legislate within the area of the Presidential reserve.28 Even when they 
sign laws, Presidents do not appear to feel bound by those provisions 
that impinge on their exclusive authority, and they will issue signing 
statements expressing that they reserve the right not to obey some 
part of the law.29 That happened, for instance, in connection with the 
federal law giving children born of U.S. citizen parents in Jerusalem 
the right to have their passports record their place of birth as 
“Jerusalem, Israel.”30 Since this assertion of congressional authority 
impinged on the President’s inherent authority to recognize foreign 
states, and to carry on diplomacy with them, the law was held 
unconstitutional.31 
This kind of a conflict might soon recur, should President 
Obama’s normalization of relations with Cuba extend to 
extinguishing the claims of those whose property was nationalized by 
the Communist government. In 1996, Congress passed the Helms-
Burton Act, ensuring that private parties whose property was 
nationalized by the Castro regime in Cuba could sue in federal court 
to prevent the transfer of such property to other parties.32 Since 
Congress has control over the jurisdiction of federal courts, it had 
authority to do so.33 By creating rights in third parties with access to 
courts to enforce those rights, Congress gave a forum to private 
parties with standing to vindicate Congress’ point of view regarding 
the communist regime in Cuba. However, in the context of the Soviet 
Union, sixty years before, the Court found in the President’s inherent 
authority the right to extinguish private claims to assets seized by the 
 
 27. A year later, Congress passed a Neutrality Act. Neutrality Act, Act of June 5, 
1794, ch. 50, 1 Stat. 381, repealed by Act of April 20, 1818, ch. 88, 3 Stat. 447, 450; CORWIN, 
supra note 16, at 220. 
 28. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 637–38 
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 29. See Sofia E. Biller, Note, Flooded by the Lowest Ebb: Congressional Responses to 
Presidential Signing Statements and Executive Hostility to the Operation of Checks and 
Balances, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1067, 1070, 1075–81 (2008); Malinda Lee, Comment, 
Reorienting the Debate on Presidential Signing Statements: The Need for Transparency in 
the President’s Constitutional Objections, Reservations, and Assertions of Power, 55 UCLA 
L. REV. 705, 709–18 (2008). 
 30. See, e.g., George W. Bush, Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations 
Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, in 2 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE 
UNITED STATES, GEORGE W. BUSH 1697–98 (Sept. 30, 2002) (regarding the federal law at 
issue in Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015)). 
 31. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2096 (2015). 
 32. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996; Pub. L. No. 104-
114, 110 Stat 785 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§	6082–85 (2012)) (Helms-Burton Act). 
 33. U.S. CONST. art. III, §	2. 
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Soviets in the Russian Revolution.34 If the Court followed that 
precedent, the Helms-Burton Act would be held unconstitutional to 
the extent it purported to prevent the President from undertaking this 
aspect of diplomacy. 
The President’s claim to inherent authority is sometimes upheld 
because of the difficulty a court would have doing otherwise, in a 
practical sense. When President Carter terminated the Mutual 
Defense Treaty with the Republic of China (Taiwan), at the same 
time recognizing the People’s Republic of China, Senator Goldwater 
and congressional colleagues (with an authorization from a majority 
of the Senate) sued to enjoin President Carter’s actions, claiming that 
since the treaty’s adoption required ratification by two-thirds of the 
Senate, its abrogation would too.35 The district court accepted Senator 
Goldwater’s reasoning.36 The D.C. Circuit reversed per curiam, 
recognizing both presidential and senatorial prerogatives, but holding 
the former prevailed since there was no explicit constitutional grant 
to the Senate regarding terminating treaties.37 The U.S. Supreme 
Court granted certiorari, vacated the opinion, and ordered the case 
dismissed, without opinion.38 
We can only speculate what grounds would have been furnished 
had the Supreme Court issued a full opinion. In addition to the 
reasoning of the D.C. Circuit that the President’s inherent diplomatic 
authority required maximum deference, this Article offers the 
pragmatic concern of how a court would structure relief. Once a 
treaty has been ratified, to what extent the United States abides by its 
 
 34. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 326–27 (1937) (upholding the President’s 
executive agreement with the Soviet Union terminating private ownership in assets 
located in New York). The President’s action was given precedence over New York’s 
public policy against confiscation of property: “[n]o state policy can prevail against the 
international compact here involved.” Id. at 327. 
 35. A statute, passed by both houses of Congress, would also be sufficient, in the 
plaintiffs’ view. Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949, 950 (D.D.C. 1979), rev’d, 617 F.2d 
697 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (mem.). 
 36. Id. 
 37. The court described that  
[t]he constitutional institution of advice and consent of the Senate, provided two-
thirds of the Senators concur, is a special and extraordinary condition of the 
exercise by the President of certain specified powers under Article II. It is not 
lightly to be extended in instances not set forth in the Constitution. Such an 
extension by implication is not proper unless that implication is unmistakably 
clear.  
Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 704 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 
(1979) (mem.). 
 38. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 996 (1979) (mem.). 
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obligations to another country is a matter entrusted to the President 
(in the absence of a self-executing provision creating enforcement 
rights in third parties). For diplomatic purposes, our country might 
wish to be more or less vigilant in adhering to treaty provisions, as 
relations with the other country change over time. It would have been 
impractical, therefore, to implement the following order entered by 
the district court:   
In view of the foregoing, it is the declaration of this Court that 
the President’s notice of termination must receive the approval 
of two-thirds of the United States Senate or a majority of both 
houses of Congress for it to be effective under our Constitution 
to terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954. It is further 
ordered that the Secretary of State and his subordinate officers 
are hereby enjoined from taking any action to implement the 
President’s notice of termination unless and until that notice is 
so approved.39 
If, following the district court’s order, the Secretary of State 
simply stopped staffing the U.S. embassy in Taipei, what could the 
district court do? Could it order a skeleton crew to arrive? Could it 
order the U.S. ambassador to take up residence there? If the 
ambassador had left (pursuant to President Carter’s order), could the 
district court order the President to nominate a replacement?40 The 
practical difficulties associated with enforcing the district court’s 
order reveal the sound logic of holding that the decision to abide by a 
treaty is within the exclusive purview of the President.41 
The assertion of inherent executive authority does not always 
succeed, of course. Most famously, President Truman asserted his 
right as commander in chief to nationalize our nation’s steel mills 
when a strike and lock-out were threatened.42 The Supreme Court 
held that labor strife involved interstate commerce, an area of shared 
responsibility between the President and Congress, and that Congress 
 
 39. Goldwater, 481 F. Supp. at 965 (footnote omitted). 
 40. By contrast, where a treaty provides that the United States (through the executive 
branch) shall not undertake a particular action, an injunction sought by a U.S. senator to 
prevent that action from taking place could be more easily ordered. Perhaps that was why 
the district court raised no impediment based on lack of standing to Senator Dole’s lawsuit 
to prevent the return of the Crown of Saint Stephen to Hungary, though ruling against him 
on the merits. See Dole v. Carter, 444 F. Supp. 1065, 1067–68 (D. Kan. 1977). 
 41. The difficulty of drafting a judicial remedy reoccurs in the context of shared 
power, where Congress has acted and the President has chosen not to enforce a law passed 
by Congress. This Article argues below that a declaratory judgment can be an effective 
remedy in such cases. See infra Section IV.C. 
 42. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 582 (1952). 
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had occupied the field with the Taft-Hartley Act.43 The 
characterization of the power in question determined that outcome. 
Had the Court instead characterized Truman’s action as that of the 
commander in chief in connection with conducting a war, the 
outcome would likely have been to uphold his actions, as in the 
Jerusalem passport case.44 
II.  INHERENTLY EXCLUSIVE CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY 
Similarly, Congress possesses inherent authority that may not be 
exercised by the President. Among those powers is the authority to 
present the President with a single piece of legislation, to which the 
President’s assent or veto is then applied. Giving the President the 
right to break up that legislation, as it was crafted by the Congress, 
into some pieces he would approve and others he would not (through 
exercise of the line-item veto) has been held to take the power of 
crafting a single legislative instrument away from Congress.45 
Confirming or rejecting Presidential appointments is another 
prerogative of Congress—in this case, the Senate.46 If an individual 
exercises executive authority, and cannot be characterized as merely 
ministerial,47 then the Senate has the prerogative to confirm or reject 
that individual’s appointment. This was the basis of Senator Riegle’s 
unsuccessful lawsuit against the Federal Reserve’s Federal Open 
Market Committee, which includes not only the governors of the 
Federal Reserve system, who are appointed by the President and 
subject to Senate approval or rejection, but also representatives of 
five of the member federal reserve banks, elected by their own boards 
and not confirmed by the Senate.48 If those member bank 
 
 43. Id. at 585–86. 
 44. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2096 (2015). 
 45. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 436–49 (1998) (arguing that the line 
item veto takes the power from Congress to present a single piece of legislation to the 
President since the President used the line item veto to invalidate portions of the law, and 
ruling that this power is unconstitutional as it is one which the Constitution did not grant 
to the President). 
 46. For an example of a claim raised by the House of Representatives under its 
powers separate from those of the Senate, see Sissel v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 951 F. Supp. 2d 159, 166–74 (D.D.C. 2013), aff’d, 760 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014), cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 925 (2016) (dismissing claims that President Obama’s Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act law operates as a tax that did not originate in the House). 
 47. U.S. CONST. art. II, §	2 (excluding only “inferior Officers,” whose appointment 
would not require Senate confirmation). 
 48. Riegle v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 874–77 (D.C. Cir. 1981). See BD. 
GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS., FEDERAL OPEN MARKET COMMITTEE, https://www
.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomc.htm [https://perma.cc/BL4F-8SC7] (last updated 
Jan. 26, 2016). 
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representatives exercise executive authority through the Federal 
Reserve Open Market Committee, then Senator Riegle argued that 
they should then have been appointed by the President and made 
subject to Senate confirmation, under Article II, section 2, of the 
Constitution.49  
Sometimes Congress willingly attempts to give away its power to 
the executive branch. The nondelegation doctrine, however, stands 
for the proposition that the Congress may not give away its inherent 
right to legislate.50 Though applications of the doctrine in majority 
opinions of the Supreme Court have not occurred in recent years, the 
non-delegation doctrine remains an important principle that 
individual justices and lower federal courts have not abandoned.51 It 
holds that Congress cannot constitutionally give to an executive 
agency the authority to promulgate regulations having the force of 
law without constraining the agency’s discretion at least in broad 
ways.52 
 
 49. Riegle, 656 F.2d at 874–77. 
 50. The Supreme Court has made this explicit: “Congress cannot delegate legislative 
power to the President to exercise an unfettered discretion to make whatever laws he 
thinks may be needed or advisable	.	.	.	.” A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 
295 U.S. 495, 537–38 (1935). But see United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 
304, 327–29 (1936) (upholding presidential action in foreign affairs under a very broad 
delegation of congressional authority). 
 51. This point is supported by Jeffrey Bossert Clark:  
While Professor Sunstein is fond of pointing out that the nondelegation doctrine 
has had only one good year—1935—because that was the only year in which the 
Supreme Court has ever invalidated any statutes under the doctrine, it is simply 
not true that the doctrine has been entirely dormant ever since the 1937 “switch in 
time that saved nine.” In the so-called Benzene Case, a plurality of Justices led by 
that latter-day fellow traveler of the Four Horsemen, Justice Stevens, construed 
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 to avoid nondelegation problems. 
Then-Justice Rehnquist, in a concurrence, would have gone farther and simply 
declared the statute unconstitutional, rather than attempting to save it. The simple 
point, however, is that given Benzene, it is just not true that the nondelegation 
doctrine is dead, or that it is the product of a fringe on the new judicial right. After 
Benzene, in a careful and scholarly opinion, Judge Williams of the D.C. Circuit, 
applied the nondelegation doctrine to the so-called Lockout/Tagout case, 
invalidating and remanding certain rules issued by the Occupational Safety & 
Health Administration (OSHA).  
Jeffrey Bossert Clark, The Recent Controversy over the Non Delegation Doctrine, 3 
ENVT’L. L. & PROP. RTS. PRAC. GROUP NEWSL., (The Federalist Society for Law & 
Public Policy Studies), Summer 1999 (footnotes omitted), http://www.fed-soc.org
/publications/detail/the-recent-controversy-over-the-non-delegation-doctrine [https://
perma.cc/M5B7-SHP2]. But see THE EFFECTIVE DEMISE OF THE NONDELEGATION 
DOCTRINE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, S. DOC. NO. 103-
6, at 78–89 (1992).  
 52. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
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Another recent example of Congress asserting its exclusive 
prerogatives is the House of Representatives’ suit against the 
Department of Health and Human Services for giving subsidies to 
insurance companies offering discounted health care policies under 
President Obama’s Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(“ACA”).53 The district court upheld the House’s view that there has 
been no appropriation for this expenditure, as required by the U.S. 
Constitution.54 This assertion goes to the heart of a congressional 
prerogative: the power of the purse.55 
If the President purports to exercise authority that cannot 
lawfully be taken away from the Congress, the remedy is 
straightforward: a party suffering individualized harm from the 
President’s action can bring an action to enjoin it.56 
III.  SHARED POWER BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 
Areas of overlapping authority between the President and 
Congress exist, either by the explicit structure of the Constitution or 
where Congress has delegated authority to the President. An example 
of the former is the overlap between Congress’ power to declare war57 
and the President’s power to wage the war as commander in chief.58 
Examples of the latter, delegated authority, include some very broad 
and some very detailed delegations. A broad delegation was 
contained in the congressional joint resolution passed after the 
September 11, 2001, attacks. The U.S. Congress conveyed the full 
extent of its shared authority to the President, without any expiration 
date, and without a specific identification of the parties or states 
 
 53. U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 185 F. Supp. 3d 165, 189 (2016) 
(granting summary judgment in favor of the House); U.S. House of Representatives v. 
Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 58 (2015) (granting the House standing in part at the motion 
to dismiss phase). See also Patent Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No.111-
148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the 42 U.S.C.). 
 54. See Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 58 (D.D.C. 2015) (granting standing to the House 
to proceed); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, §	9, cl. 7 (“No money shall be drawn from the 
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.”). 
 55. See S. DOC. NO. 103-6, at 156. 
 56. Though unsuccessful on the merits, an example of such congressional claims 
includes House members’ attempts to stop President Carter from turning over property to 
Panama in the Panama Canal Zone. Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1055–56 (D.C. Cir. 
1978). These attempts were allegedly in violation of the U.S. Constitution’s article IV, 
section 3, cl. 2 requirement that property of the United States be disposed of by Congress, 
not simply pursuant to a treaty ratified by the Senate, which was only one part of 
Congress. Id.  
 57. U.S. CONST. art. I, §	8, cl. 11. 
 58. U.S. CONST. art. II, §	2, cl. 1. 
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against whom that power could be used.59 An example of a very 
narrow delegation is the 1973 War Powers Act,60 which became law in 
a very different historical context—the Vietnam conflict. Under that 
statute, the President has detailed obligations to inform Congress 
about the insertion of U.S. military into hostilities, and then to 
withdraw U.S. military after sixty days, barring explicit authorization 
by Congress.61 Similarly, in the case of Iran’s pursuit of nuclear 
weapons, Congress had imposed sanctions, but allowed the Secretary 
of the Treasury to waive them when in the national interest.62 This 
shared power made it possible for President Obama to reach 
agreement with Iran, but did not effectuate a permanent change in 
law. Hence, President Trump can order the Secretary of the Treasury 
to revoke the waiver.63 
In the domestic sphere, a recent example of broad delegation of 
authority is the Dodd-Frank Act, enacted after the Wall Street 
collapse of 2008.64 There are 398 specific calls in the statute for 
regulatory agencies, including the newly created Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau, to issue rules, interpreting vague concepts such as 
“unfairness” by financial institutions, and “systemic risk.”65 Under 
this authority, the executive branch has stretched to address problems 
totally unconnected with the 2008 financial crisis, including whether 
banks show racial patterns in the rates they charge for car loans and 
the tuition charged by for-profit colleges.66 A contrasting example, 
 
 59. The language of this authorization declared that 
the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those 
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, 
or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored 
such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international 
terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations, or 
persons	.	.	.	.	[T]he Congress declares that this section is intended to constitute 
specific statutory authorization within the meaning of	.	.	.	the War Powers 
Resolution.  
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, §	2, 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001). 
 60. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified as 
amended at 50 U.S.C. §§	1541–48 (2012)).  
 61. 50 U.S.C. §§	1542–1544 (2012). 
 62. 22 U.S.C. §	8513(f) (2012). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
 65. See Peter J. Wallison, Opinion, Four Years of Dodd-Frank Damage, WALL ST. J., 
July 21, 2014, at A13. 
 66. Steven Davidoff Solomon, Protection Bureau’s Stormy Path to Reform the Auto 
Finance Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2015, at B5. Whether so broad a stretch could break 
the limits set by the nondelegation doctrine depends on whether Dodd-Frank can be said 
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where Congress limited the role of the President in an area of shared 
power, was the Steel Seizure case: the executive could deal with 
impending labor strife only by the specific tools provided in the Taft-
Hartley Act to handle strikes with national impact.67 
A. The President Acts, Congress Does Not 
Where, in an area of constitutional federal authority, no statute 
has been passed, the President is free to act.68 In Chenoweth v. 
Clinton,69 Congresswoman Chenoweth and three colleagues asserted 
that the President could not act in an area where Congress might have 
acted, but decided not to do so: designating certain rivers as 
historically significant and in need of preservation.70 She was denied 
standing for lack of a particularized harm.71 If a private party with 
sufficient standing had been the plaintiff, the likely outcome would 
have been against the plaintiff. It might be that the President’s action 
in a space of Congressional nonaction stimulates a legislative 
response; but until that happens, the President’s policy prevails in the 
shared space. 
As another example, a President might choose to designate a 
national monument over an area that had been considered, but 
rejected, for “National Park” status by Congress.72 It is unwise to infer 
from Congress’ decision not to proceed in any given area that 
Congress does not wish the President to act. Indeed, it is difficult to 
infer anything from congressional nonaction. The decision not to 
proceed might reflect the existence of more pressing business, or 
simply that the individual leading the legislative initiative was not 
popular with colleagues. 
 
to provide an “intelligible principle” for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to use 
in asserting authority over the practices mentioned. See S. DOC. NO. 103-6, at 78 (1992). 
 67. Labor Management Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, §§	202, 209, 61 Stat. 136, 
153, 155–56 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§	172, 178 (2012)); Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 585–86 (1952). 
 68. Cf. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“When the President 
acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon 
his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may 
have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, 
congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least, as a practical 
matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility.”). 
 69. Chenoweth v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 112 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
 70. Id. at 112–13. 
 71. Id. at 117. 
 72. Robert W. Righter, National Monuments to National Parks: The Use of the 
Antiquities Act of 1906, 20 WESTERN HIST. Q. 281, 281–82 (1989). See National 
Monuments Act, 54 U.S.C. §	320301(a) (2012). 
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B. Congress Acts and the President Acts 
In an area of shared responsibility, it is critical to ascertain 
whether Congress intended to fully occupy the field.73 The degree of 
detail in a statute is one indicator of Congress’ desire to exclude the 
executive.74 The War Powers Act, for instance, does so in stating 
[t]he constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-
Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, 
or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is 
clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only 
pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory 
authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack 
upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its 
armed forces.75 
In other words, without action by Congress (clauses one and two), the 
President cannot act unless there has been an attack on the United 
States. 
The constitutionality of the War Powers Act has never been 
determined,76 but its structure and language leave no doubt of 
Congress’ intent to “occupy the field” of initiating military 
operations. In other statutes less clear than the War Powers Act, 
however, congressional intent to occupy the field might need to be 
clarified by adding the following template: 
The structure of this act is intended to be the exclusive means 
for dealing with [fill in the subject area], excluding the President 
and executive agencies from taking actions not explicitly 
authorized to be taken by them in this act to the maximum 
extent constitutionally permissible. 
Had such language been included in President Obama’s ACA, 
the Supreme Court decision regarding Medicaid subsidies to states 
 
 73. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 637–38, 637 n.4 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 74. In the Steel Seizure case, the Court relied on the fact that Congress had addressed 
the problem that might necessitate seizure of private assets in two statutes: the Selective 
Service Act of 1948 and the Defense Production Act of 1950. See id. at 586. It was also 
important that Congress dealt with labor disputes in another, the Labor Management 
Relations Act. See id. The Court considered it determinative that none of them granted 
the President the power he was asserting in the case before the Court. See id. at 586. 
 75. 50 U.S.C. §	1541(c) (2012). 
 76. The statute is, I believe, a workable compromise between the Congress’ right to 
declare war and the President’s right to wage war, and to defend against attacks as 
commander in chief. The statute was passed over President Nixon’s veto, see Campbell v. 
Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 28–29 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Silberman, J., concurring), and Presidents 
since then have asserted its unconstitutionality. 
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that did not set up their own exchanges would almost certainly have 
been different.77 In that case, the Court was left with conflicting 
signals. The statute appeared to require that a state set up an 
exchange in order to receive federal financial help for its lower 
income residents. Indeed, that conclusion was famously suggested as 
the intended purpose for the conditional language—to induce states 
to create exchanges since the federal government could not directly 
compel them to do so.78 However, the majority found that the 
overwhelming purpose of the ACA was to foster maximum 
participation of the population in health insurance coverage, which 
would be encouraged by subsidies to the states.79 In light of that goal, 
the predicate of having an exchange was not required for a state to 
receive a subsidy.80 The statutory template this Article proposes 
above could have removed this ambiguity between the Act’s purpose 
and its structure. 
Of course, Congress may wish to invite expansive executive 
activity by explicitly calling for executive branch regulations, as in the 
Dodd-Frank statute discussed above, or by drafting the governing law 
in the broadest terms.81 If this is Congress’ intent, then it would not 
use the template language this Article proposed.82 
C. Congress Acts, the President Does Not 
The President has authority to allocate scarce enforcement 
resources, as in choosing whom to prosecute in the criminal field,83 or 
 
 77. See generally King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (interpreting the Affordable 
Care Act’s exchange provisions, after determining that they were ambiguous, as requiring 
tax credits for insurance purchased on any exchange, both state and federal). 
 78. See, e.g., Avik Roy, Contrary to White House Denials, Emails Show Jonathan 
Gruber Was “Integral” to Obamacare, FORBES (June 21, 2015, 11:03 PM), http://www
.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary/2015/06/21/contrary-to-white-house-denials-emails-show-
jonathan-gruber-was-integral-to-obamacare/#548ec59111bf [https://perma.cc/H5GJ-34L3]. 
 79. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. at 2492–93. 
 80. Id. at 2495–96. 
 81. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-203, §	5, 38 Stat. 
717, 719–20 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §	45 (2012)) (prohibiting in broad terms 
“unfair methods of competition”). Whether in case-by-case adjudication, or in 
promulgating rules, the Federal Trade Commission was expected by Congress to be filling 
in what “unfair” meant.  
 82. Congress might also prefer to let the courts develop a sort of common law to 
implement its broad policy goals. The antitrust laws are such examples. See Donald 
Dewey, The Common-Law Background of Antitrust Policy, 41 VA. L. REV. 759, 759 
(1955). 
 83. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (“Finally, we recognize that an 
agency’s refusal to institute proceedings shares to some extent the characteristics of the 
decision of a prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to indict—a decision which has long 
been regarded as the special province of the Executive Branch, inasmuch as it is the 
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using discretion in the administrative law context, contemplated by 
the specification of its opposite—“abuse of discretion,” in the 
Administrative Procedure Act (“the APA”).84 What principle can be 
used to distinguish permissible executive discretion from 
circumstances that could be the basis of a successful challenge?85 The 
key is to determine whether the structure of the law written by 
Congress was undermined by the executive’s nonaction.86 
One can imagine instances where selective executive branch 
nonenforcement destroys the law’s structure. For instance, the 
National Labor Relations Act was amended in 1947 to extend the 
National Labor Relations Board’s authority to outlaw unfair labor 
practices to reach such practices by labor unions.87 From its passage in 
 
Executive who is charged by the Constitution to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed.’	” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, §	3)). 
 84. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §	706(2)(A) (2012). 
 85. One answer to the question is this 
[i]f the core executive function is to apply general laws to particular cases, the 
central legislative task is to formulate general laws and policies for the executive 
and judicial branches to implement. The executive branch thus exceeds its proper 
role, and enters the legislature’s domain, if without proper congressional 
authorization it uses enforcement discretion to categorically suspend enforcement 
or to license particular violations.  
Price, supra note 1, at 676. 
 86. This allows for the conclusion that “policies that amount in practice to a 
prospective guarantee of nonenforcement to broad categories of offenders should be 
presumptively improper.” Price, supra note 21, at 1137. For examples of where 
nonenforcement undermines the basic policy of the statute in the context of President 
Obama’s ACA, see Price, supra note 1, at 750–54. Professor Price contrasts this kind of 
nonenforcement from a decision “to turn a blind eye to some violations so as to 
concentrate on others—that is, to set priorities for enforcement without altering the basic 
policy of the statute.” Price, supra note 21, at 1137. 
  A slightly different formulation, by Professor Sant’Ambrogio, calls the President’s 
nonaction into question if Congress has spoken clearly in favor of enforcement, and the 
President has chosen to “completely abandon the enforcement of the statute.” Michael 
Sant’Ambrogio, The Extra-Legislative Veto, 102 GEO. L.J. 351, 397 (2014). Professor 
Sant’Ambrogio writes: 
[T]he Executive cannot use its enforcement discretion to wholly abdicate its 
responsibilities under the statute. As the Court explained in Chaney, the 
presumption against reviewability does not apply when the agency has 
“	‘consciously and expressly adopted a general policy’ that is so extreme as to 
amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities.” 
Id. at 395 (quoting Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc)).  
  I believe Sant’Ambrogio’s formulation, while true to the language of Chaney, is a 
bit too forgiving. The structure of a statute could be undermined by selective enforcement, 
as well as by completely abandoning enforcement. 
 87. Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, sec. 101, §	8(b), 61 Stat. 
136, 141–42 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §	158(b) (2012)). 
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1935 until the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, the Act had only identified 
unfair labor practices by employers.88 If a National Labor Relations 
Board followed a policy of only pursuing unfair labor practices by 
employers today, it would eviscerate the balance sought by Congress 
in 1947. This would not be an instance of marshalling scarce 
enforcement resources towards the highest priorities; it would be an 
undoing of the balance within the congressional scheme. 
Another hypothetical of impermissible nonenforcement is for a 
President, with a strong pro-investor point of view, to order the 
Internal Revenue Service (“the IRS”) not to pursue taxpayers for 
omitting to pay tax on capital gains. It would be entirely permissible 
for the IRS to pursue large tax evaders over smaller ones, but to 
exclude a class of income covered by the Internal Revenue Code from 
effective taxation entirely would destroy the structure of that statute. 
An illustration of where nonenforcement does not undermine 
the structure of a statute is the Obama administration’s decision not 
to devote scarce law enforcement resources to prosecute marijuana 
possession in states where such possession is legal under state law.89 
While Congress has outlawed marijuana possession, it does not 
violate the congressional scheme for the President to choose to 
enforce the law in states where the assistance of local law 
enforcement is more forthcoming. The President might be involved in 
selective prosecution, but not in a way contrary to the congressional 
scheme.90 
A more complex case involves the decision by a President simply 
not to enforce some laws at all rather than mere selective prosecution. 
Does this undermine the congressional scheme in enacting the law? 
Consider an example: neither the U.S. Department of Justice, which 
is under the President’s direction, nor the Federal Trade Commission, 
an independent agency, has since 2000 brought an action against a 
 
 88. 1947 Taft-Hartley Passage and NLRB Structural Changes, NAT’L LAB. REL. 
BOARD, http://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/our-history/1947-taft-hartley-passage-and-nlrb-
structural-changes [https://perma.cc/3DQV-LPG5] (stating that “[u]nder the Wagner Act, 
there were only employer unfair labor practices”). 
 89. See generally Memorandum from James M. Cole, supra note 7 (explaining this 
decision). 
 90. See Price, supra note 1, at 757. The contrary argument would be that Congress 
considered transportation of marijuana between states to be of particular concern, so that 
nonenforcement anywhere undermined the overall fabric of enforcement. This view was 
also voiced by the Department of Justice, focusing on “preventing the diversion of 
marijuana from states where it is legal under state law in some form to other states.” 
Memorandum from James M. Cole, supra note 7. 
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wholesaler for discriminating in price among retailers.91 Each agency 
considers enforcing the Robinson-Patman Act, which outlaws such 
discriminatory pricing behavior,92 a very low priority, especially since 
private enforcement is available for parties who can show they were 
harmed in a way that damaged competition.93 Hence, the executive 
branch’s failure to enforce the Robinson-Patman Act does not 
eviscerate congressional intent in outlawing price discrimination: at 
least some victims can sue in their own right. 
These examples aid us in analyzing the actual case of the Obama 
administration’s actions deferring deportation of whole categories of 
individuals. Congress enacted a comprehensive immigration policy, 
identifying categories of persons entitled to apply for permanent 
residency.94 In sequential executive pronouncements, the Obama 
administration stated it would not deport children illegally brought 
into this country by their parents, and it would not deport parents of 
children born in this country, though the parents had entered 
illegally.95 
Congress had enacted a complex scheme to identify which aliens 
could apply for legal residency. The President treated those 
categories as nonexhaustive: the categories of aliens that Congress 
sought to protect would be allowed to stay, but the President 
proposed to protect others, too.96 The states suing President Obama, 
by contrast, argued that Congress intended to occupy the field of 
which aliens could stay in America,97 so that the President’s failing to 
 
 91. AM. BAR ASS’N, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 497–98 (7th ed. 2012) 
(“While the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice both have 
jurisdiction to enforce the act, in practice the FTC is the only agency that exercises it. The 
FTC has brought few cases since the 1980s and last brought a case in 2000.”). See William 
F. Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the “Common Law” Nature 
of Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 661, 662 n.6 (1982) (describing the Robinson-Patman 
Act as not a “true” antitrust law). Baxter was the Assistant Attorney General for 
Antitrust in the Reagan administration while I was Director of the Bureau of 
Competition, the antitrust enforcement arm of the Federal Trade Commission. 
 92. 15 U.S.C. §	13 (2012). 
 93. Baxter, supra note 91, at 682, 690–91. Not every price discrimination has an effect 
on the market, in which case a private party denied the benefit of a lower price would not 
be able to sue. See generally J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557 
(1981) (holding a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act to be insufficient to state a claim 
without a showing of actual antitrust injury and damages). 
 94. 8 U.S.C. §	1151 (2012). 
 95. See Mayorkas, supra note 5; Executive Actions on Immigration, supra note 5. 
 96. See Mayorkas, supra note 5; Executive Actions on Immigration, supra note 5. 
 97. There is ambiguity in the statutory scheme. The deportation provisions of the 
statute require a specific order for each individual to be deported, signed by the Attorney 
General. 8 U.S.C. §	1227(a) (2012) (“Any alien	.	.	.	in and admitted to the United States 
shall, upon the order of the Attorney General, be removed if the alien is within one or 
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deport those not included in Congress’ categories was a violation of 
his duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”98 The 
Solicitor General claimed99 that President Obama’s deferred action 
orders were no different in kind from President George W. Bush’s 
decision to allow foreign students whose studies were interrupted by 
Hurricane Katrina to stay an extra semester,100 or the decision by 
President Obama to grant temporary protected status to citizens of 
countries where Ebola made it unsafe for them to return.101 
The distinction between these examples illustrates the 
fundamental point at issue. In deciding specific nonenforcement out 
of compassion for victims of a natural disaster, or for those for whom 
return would pose especially high health risks, President Bush and 
President Obama were not making decisions that undermined the 
immigration structure established by Congress. However, President 
Obama’s decision to treat certain categories specified by Congress as 
nonexclusive to allow lawful residence may well have frustrated the 
immigration structure. An established maxim of statutory 
interpretation is that to express one case is to exclude others.102 It 
 
more of the following classes of deportable aliens	.	.	.	.”). This statutory language strongly 
suggests that an individualized determination had to be made within the executive branch, 
even for those who did not fall within the categories specifying whom Congress wanted to 
stay. As pointed out above in the context of the state exchanges under President Obama’s 
health insurance law, it would have been quite helpful for Congress to have inserted into 
the immigration statute that the categories it created for individuals to stay in America 
lawfully were intended to be exclusive. 
 98. U.S. CONST. art. II, §	3, cl. 4; Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733, 746 (5th Cir. 
2015), aff’d on other grounds, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally divided 
court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (mem.). 
 99. See Brief for Petitioner at 48–50, United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 906 (2016) (No. 
15-674). 
 100. Press Release, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., USCIS Announces Interim 
Relief for Foreign Students Adversely Impacted by Hurricane Katrina (Nov. 25, 2005), 
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/pressrelease/F1Student_11_25_05_PR.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Q4F5-R7K7]. 
 101. Temporary Protected Status, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS (Oct. 26, 
2016), https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status [https://perma.cc
/SJ2K-AJXE] (stating that “[t]he Secretary of Homeland Security may designate a foreign 
country for TPS due to conditions in the country that temporarily prevent the country’s 
nationals from returning safely, or in certain circumstances, where the country is unable to 
handle the return of its nationals adequately”). A recent example is Guinea, added 
because of the Ebola epidemic. Designation of Guinea for Temporary Protected Status, 79 
Fed. Reg. 69,511, 69,511 (Nov. 21, 2014). 
 102. 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction §	47:23, at 406 (Norman J. Singer & 
Shambie Singer, eds., 7th ed. 2014). See also Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the 
Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J. 341, 351 (2010) (explaining that “[e]xpressio 
unius stands for the common sense language rule that the expression of one thing suggests 
the exclusion of another thing”). 
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would be difficult to infer that, having specified with great care all the 
criteria for lawful admission, Congress’ will was not subverted by a 
President’s determination that he could allow others to stay in the 
United States who entered it unlawfully, and did not meet the 
specified criteria.103 Indeed, President Obama appeared to believe so 
himself, at least throughout his first term.104 
For a court to require the executive to justify its failure to act is 
not unprecedented. Indeed, courts do so whenever an executive 
agency’s action is challenged as discriminatory under the 
Administrative Procedure Act.105 Discrimination in enforcement 
would be subject to correction by the reviewing court if it were found 
to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law.”106 
Discrimination has two components: enforcing the law against 
one group and not enforcing it against another. The executive can 
defend against such a claim by identifying a reason for both. Taken 
alone, an administrative agency’s decision not to take an enforcement 
action has, since Heckler v. Chaney,107 been held to be 
 
 103. See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 1, at 853–54. 
 104. See United States v. Juarez-Escobar, 25 F. Supp. 3d 774, 783 (W.D. Pa. 2014); 
Remarks by the President at Univision Town Hall, White House (Mar. 28, 2011), https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/28/remarks-president-univision-town
-hall [https://perma.cc/ZD9U-KFS3] (declaring that “[w]ith respect to the notion that I can 
just suspend deportations through executive order, that’s just not the case, because there 
are laws on the books that Congress has passed.	.	.	.	There are enough laws on the books 
by Congress that are very clear in terms of how we have to enforce our immigration 
system that for me to simply through executive order ignore those congressional mandates 
would not conform with my appropriate role as President”). When President Obama 
announced his decision to act unilaterally, despite the immediately foregoing statement, 
he explained that he was doing so in the face of an intransigient Congress, and that he 
would have preferred to solve the problem legislatively. See Remarks by the President in 
Address to the Nation on Immigration, White House (Nov. 20, 2014), https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/issues/immigration/immigration-action [https://perma.cc/KB9X-
TLK5]. 
 105. 5 U.S.C. §	500 (2012). 
 106. Id. §	706 (2012). Indeed the statute explicitly grants review when an agency 
withholds an action. Id. (“The reviewing court shall—(1) compel agency action unlawfully 
withheld or unreasonably delayed; and (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, 
findings, and conclusions found to be—(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law; (B) contrary to constitutional right, power, 
privilege, or immunity; [or] (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, 
or short of statutory right	.	.	.	.”). The Administrative Procedure Act provides the standard 
for interested parties to challenge action by federal departments and agencies; it is the 
most common vehicle for attempting to overturn agency rule-making and adjudication in 
individual cases. See II ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §	11.4, at 1018–22 (Richard J. 
Pierce, Jr. ed., 5th ed. 2010). 
 107. 470 U.S. 821 (1985). 
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nonreviewable.108 A claim of discrimination, however, remains 
cognizable and adjudicating any such claim necessarily involves a 
court’s consideration of the agency’s decision not to act in one case 
while acting in another.109 
Suppose it was statistically proven that the Food and Drug 
Administration (“the FDA”) cracked down on the sale of drugs not 
authorized by the FDA predominantly where the pharmacist was of a 
minority race. The FDA could defend on the basis that some other 
factor was at work—for example, that fewer complaints were received 
of illegal drug use in majority race neighborhoods, which tended to 
have majority race pharmacists. In making that explanation, the FDA 
would be defending its decision not to enforce the law, in the case of 
white pharmacists, on the basis of complaints, not race. 
Consider next the case where the FDA enforced the registration 
requirement for the sale of pharmaceuticals only in states that 
promised to provide the FDA substantial inspection and enforcement 
assistance. The pharmacist against whom the FDA seeks enforcement 
action could argue the FDA’s decision was arbitrary and capricious, 
and “not in accordance with law,” since obtaining assistance from 
state agencies was nowhere in the scheme of the FDA action.110 The 
basis for the difference in treatment was thus ultra vires. The FDA 
would defend, successfully, by claiming it was exercising a degree of 
judgment that was contemplated in administrative law and not 
undermining of the scheme of the FDA statute.111 
Finally, consider the case where the FDA fails to enforce the 
drug registration requirement anywhere. Assuming there is a party 
with standing, the premise for the challenge and the defense by the 
FDA would be the same as in the first two instances. There either was 
or was not a basis for the FDA’s choosing not to proceed. If not, 
FDA’s inaction would be arbitrary and capricious. If there was a 
basis, the question would turn to whether that basis was contemplated 
by the statute, or undermined the statute.112 In the latter case, the 
FDA’s action would be deemed not in accordance with law. 
 
 108. Id. at 831 (holding it was not an abuse of discretion for the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration to refuse to interfere with the use of lethal drugs in carrying out the death 
penalty). 
 109. See III ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, §	17.5, at 1587–88 (Richard J. Pierce, 
Jr. ed., 5th ed. 2010). 
 110. 5 U.S.C. §	706(2)(A) (2012).  
 111. See III ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, supra note 109, §	17.1, at 1559–60. 
 112. 5 U.S.C. §	706 (2012) (“The reviewing court shall hold unlawful and set aside 
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be	.	.	.	not in accordance with law.”). 
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Administrative law, therefore, already contains all the elements 
required to evaluate a challenge to executive nonaction.113 The 
difference between administrative law cases evaluating agency 
enforcement practices under an “arbitrary and capricious” standard 
and the broader cases of executive nonenforcement is not that it is 
difficult or novel to compel the executive to explain its nonaction. 
Rather, it comes down to whether a court can expect to order 
meaningful relief, and whether a plaintiff with standing exists.114 
IV.  REMEDIES 
Thus, a court does have the means to identify unlawful executive 
action and nonaction. But, can a court order a meaningful remedy? 
Where the President acts in an area reserved to the exclusive 
authority of Congress, the remedy is for a court to invalidate the 
President’s action, leaving Congress a free rein.115 
Where the President has failed to act, however, the question of 
remedy is more complicated. Sometimes the deficiency is specifically 
identified, as in the Environmental Protection Agency (“the EPA”) 
grant to New York City that President Nixon impounded,116 and then 
the party that would benefit from the President enforcing the law can 
obtain an order that the executive do so. Where the President’s 
reluctance to enforce a law does not have such an identifiably harmed 
private party, however, the question arises whether Congress can 
itself take steps to force the President to start enforcing the law. In 
the Sections that follow will discuss what remedies might be available 
 
 113. Another example of the courts already making the kind of decisions required to 
analyze executive nonaction is the doctrine of severability. Under this doctrine of 
constitutional law, courts have had to decide whether a part of a law, held to be 
unconstitutional, was essential to the congressional intent in passing the law. See Alaska 
Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987). See generally Tom Campbell, Severability 
of Statutes, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1495 (2011) (arguing that the severability process should be 
entirely abolished because severability creates law that the legislature never intended). 
The same kind of analysis is required to conclude whether a President’s failure to enforce 
part of a law undermines congressional intent. 
 114. Love and Garg argue against the likelihood or efficacy of judicial review of agency 
inaction, for reasons of justiciability, among others. See Love & Garg, supra note 1, at 
1227–29. 
 115. Likewise, in the instance of Congress acting in an area of inherent exclusive 
executive authority, the remedy is straightforward: a court can rule the congressional 
action (a statute) unconstitutional, and the executive proceeds unimpeded. See, e.g., 
Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2096 (2015). 
 116. Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 40. The Court held that the EPA had no 
discretion to refuse to allocate the full amount appropriated by Congress for specific water 
pollution control projects, even though the President had ordered funds impounded due to 
the budget deficit. Id. at 44–48. 
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to Congress, whether they would be practical, and whether current 
jurisprudence would grant Congress standing to pursue such relief. 
A. Nonjudicial Remedies 
Congress has many tools available to put pressure on the 
President.117 For example, disagreeing with the President’s failure to 
spend money as they wish, members of subcommittees of the 
Appropriations Committees in both the House and the Senate can 
threaten to withhold appropriations in particular areas in subsequent 
years, which may cause the executive branch to accommodate. In my 
personal experience, report language in appropriations bills, even 
though not part of the legislative enactment,118 constitute memorials 
of such understandings. Other weapons in a war between the 
branches over the President’s failure to take action include a Senate 
hold on the confirmation of a Presidential appointee, often, but not 
necessarily, in the same field as the challenged presidential 
nonaction.119 
These political weapons should not be the only means at 
Congress’ disposal to vindicate its legitimate right to see its laws 
enforced, nor should they be the preferred means in every case. The 
political weapons could be too strong. The ultimate threat Congress 
has is to shut down funding for the federal government, but that 
escalates what might have been a limited area of disagreement with 
the President into a massive consequence affecting the entire nation. 
Further, not every dispute between the President and Congress is 
political in nature; a good faith dispute over constitutional authority 
ought not be resolved by the balance of brute political force that 
might exist between a President and a Congress at any particular 
time. Therefore, redress of a dispute between the political branches 
through the nonpolitical third branch could be very beneficial.120 
 
 117. Christenson and Kriner make this the focus of their article, explaining that the 
failure of Presidents to take more unilateral action is due to the threat of informal 
retaliation from Congress, and the public. See Christenson & Kriner, supra note 2, at 908. 
 118. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES 
AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 
67 (4th ed. 2007). 
 119. President Clinton refused to bring reverse discrimination cases in areas of race-
conscious action by government that his administration considered benign. In response, 
the Senate, controlled by the Republicans during the last six years of his presidency, 
refused to confirm his designee as Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights. See 
Christopher Marquis, Clinton Sidesteps Senate to Fill Civil Rights Enforcement Job, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 4, 2000, at A14; Clinton Makes Lee Acting Civil Rights Chief, CNN (Dec. 15, 
1997), http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1997/12/15/lee/ [https://perma.cc/KDT6-YKYA]. 
 120. See TOM CAMPBELL, SEPARATION OF POWERS IN PRACTICE 193–97 (2004). 
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B. Injunctive Remedies 
The Supreme Court has held that a decision by the executive 
branch not to enforce a law is presumptively unreviewable by a 
court.121 Practical considerations underlie that conclusion. A plaintiff 
has to show that the remedy a court is able to order is likely to 
ameliorate the plaintiff’s concrete injury.122 It is difficult, however, to 
craft an injunction that a court would use to grant relief in a case of 
nonaction. For instance, President Obama chose not to deport classes 
of individuals not legally present in the United States.123 If a court had 
ordered him to do so, how many deportations would have sufficed? 
He also ordered the Department of Justice not to indict individuals 
for marijuana possession in states that have legalized private 
possession.124 If ordered to abandon that policy, would President 
Obama have shown sufficient compliance by bringing ten such cases a 
year?125 
 
 121. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (holding that “[r]efusals to take 
enforcement steps generally involve precisely the opposite situation, and in that situation 
we think the presumption is that judicial review is not available”). This is the case despite 
the APA’s empowerment of federal courts to “compel agency action unlawfully withheld 
or unreasonably delayed.” 5 U.S.C. §	706(1) (2012). Hence, this Article concludes that the 
Heckler court treated the APA as though it had an additional phrase at the end of Section 
706(1), as if it read “where the court can accomplish such a result.”  
 122. The Supreme Court has held 
on several occasions over many years that an agency’s decision not to prosecute or 
enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally 
committed to an agency’s absolute discretion. This recognition of the existence of 
discretion is attributable in no small part to the general unsuitability for judicial 
review of agency decisions to refuse enforcement.  
Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831 (citations omitted). “[I]t must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely 
‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’	” Lujan v. Defs. of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 
26, 38, 43 (1976)). See also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007) (citing Lujan, 
504 U.S. at 560–61) (holding that “[t]o ensure the proper adversarial presentation, Lujan 
holds that a litigant must demonstrate that	.	.	.	it is likely that a favorable decision will 
redress that injury.”). 
 123. See Mayorkas, supra note 5; Executive Actions on Immigration, supra note 5. 
 124. See Memorandum from James M. Cole, supra note 7. 
 125. Professor Stern has noted that  
[i]t is difficult to envision a ruling that would ensure that the Executive enforced a 
law in a manner satisfactory to congressional plaintiffs. Precise metrics do not exist 
for assessing the adequacy of such efforts, and the Court might well rear back from 
issuing a potentially messy, if not futile, decree. The judiciary’s lack of competence 
to supervise military training was a significant factor in the Court’s holding that a 
suit seeking such relief presented a political question. Similar considerations of 
manageability could inform its ruling on legislator standing to force the Executive 
to do its job.  
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When the Supreme Court has overruled a President’s nonaction, 
it has been in the context of a very specific circumstance, such as an 
EPA project for which Congress appropriated money for New York 
City that President Nixon nevertheless failed to fund.126 No general 
order to fund environmental projects was requested; New York City 
had a specific project on the list of EPA-approved beneficiaries, and 
all the Court had to do was unfreeze the money.127 Similarly, in 
Dunlop v. Bachowski,128 the Court felt it appropriate to order the 
Secretary of Labor to undertake an investigation of a kind specifically 
authorized in the governing statute when details of an individual case 
were presented to the Secretary.129 When the EPA refused to 
 
Stern, supra note 1, at 44–45 (footnote omitted). 
 126. Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 47 (1975). 
 127. While the Court in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), did order the EPA 
to make a finding regarding greenhouse gas emissions from automobiles, it did not have 
before it the adequacy of what the EPA did upon making such a finding, id. at 534–35. A 
change in Presidential administrations mooted the difficulty the Court would have had in 
determining how much EPA activity would constitute compliance with the Court’s holding 
that nonaction was unacceptable. Cf. Love & Garg, supra note 1, at 1227 (crediting the 
widespread publicity of greenhouse gas regulation as the reason why the Court decided to 
step in, and recognizing that many other “low-salience instances of executive inaction” 
never receive their day in court). 
 128. 421 U.S. 560 (1975). 
 129. Id. at 573. In Heckler v. Chaney, the Court explained this as a departure from the 
usual rule of deferring to the executive branch’s discretion:  
Dunlop v. Bachowski, relied upon heavily by respondents and the majority in the 
Court of Appeals, presents an example of statutory language which supplied 
sufficient standards to rebut the presumption of unreviewability. Dunlop involved 
a suit by a union employee, under the Labor-Management Reporting and 
Disclosure Act (LMRDA), asking the Secretary of Labor to investigate and file 
suit to set aside a union election. Section 482 provided that, upon filing of a 
complaint by a union member, “[t]he Secretary shall investigate such complaint 
and, if he finds probable cause to believe that a violation	.	.	.	has occurred	.	.	.	he 
shall	.	.	.	bring a civil action	.	.	.	.” After investigating the plaintiff’s claims the 
Secretary of Labor declined to file suit, and the plaintiff sought judicial review 
under the APA. This Court held that review was available. It rejected the 
Secretary’s argument that the statute precluded judicial review, and in a footnote 
it stated its agreement with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the 
decision was not “an unreviewable exercise of prosecutorial discretion.” Our 
textual references to the “strong presumption” of reviewability in Dunlop were 
addressed only to the §	(a)(1) exception; we were content to rely on the Court of 
Appeals’ opinion to hold that the §	(a)(2) exception did not apply. The Court of 
Appeals, in turn, had found the “principle of absolute prosecutorial discretion” 
inapplicable, because the language of the LMRDA indicated that the Secretary 
was required to file suit if certain “clearly defined” factors were present. The 
decision therefore was not “beyond the judicial capacity to supervise.” 
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833–34 (1985) (citations omitted). See also 
Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 86, at 395 (citing Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1162 
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promulgate rules on greenhouse gas emissions, the Court was also 
willing to order executive action: namely, that the EPA commence 
administrative rulemaking on that subject. The Court intimated, 
however, that it would likely not order any specific enforcement 
action if the EPA did not wish to bring a case against any given 
greenhouse gas emitter.130 
The Court has also allowed review of executive nonenforcement 
of law where the heart of the challenge to executive nonaction is 
discriminatory treatment.131 One way by which this occurs is where 
the executive enforces a law against some but not others if the first 
entity can claim the difference in treatment is due to a basis that 
would violate the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments.132 In such a case, 
a court can craft a remedy by simply ordering the action against the 
first entity to cease.133 
For example, if the President ordered that no income tax evasion 
cases be brought against white taxpayers, a black taxpayer would 
have standing to challenge a tax evasion action against her. This 
would be an indirect remedy, since the court would not actually order 
 
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc)) (discussing the Chaney Court’s treatment of Bachowski and 
the lower court opinion ordering executive action in Adams). 
 130. The Supreme Court also stated that 
[s]ome debate remains, however, as to the rigor with which we review an agency’s 
denial of a petition for rulemaking. There are key differences between a denial of 
a petition for rulemaking and an agency’s decision not to initiate an enforcement 
action. In contrast to nonenforcement decisions, agency refusals to initiate 
rulemaking “are less frequent, more apt to involve legal as opposed to factual 
analysis, and subject to special formalities, including a public explanation.” They 
moreover arise out of denials of petitions for rulemaking which (at least in the 
circumstances here) the affected party had an undoubted procedural right to file in 
the first instance. Refusals to promulgate rules are thus susceptible to judicial 
review, though such review is “extremely limited” and “highly deferential.”  
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 527–28 (citations omitted) (overruling EPA’s decision 
not to regulate greenhouse gas emissions). See Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 86, at 397. 
 131. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886); cf. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 838 
(“No colorable claim is made in this case that the agency’s refusal to institute proceedings 
violated any constitutional rights of respondents, and we do not address the issue that 
would be raised in such a case.”). 
 132. Discriminatory enforcement by the federal executive would violate the Fifth 
Amendment’s requirement that no person be “deprived of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend V. State executive action of that kind 
would violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition against denying any person the 
“equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Such discrimination could be 
litigated under the judicial review provision of the Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 
U.S.C. §	702 (2012); 28 U.S.C. §	1983 (2012). 
 133. This is what occurred as a result of the Supreme Court’s remand in Yick Wo. See 
Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 374. 
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the President to enforce the law against white taxpayers. The action 
the court can take only indirectly puts pressure on the executive 
branch. The heart of the complaint is that the President has used a 
statute in an unconstitutional way, and the remedy is to end the 
discrimination by stopping prosecutions, not by ordering them.134 
Beyond the exceptions noted, however, it is generally difficult to 
see how a court could effectively draft an order to compel 
enforcement of a law in the face of the executive’s wholesale policy 
decision not to do so.135 
C. Declaratory Judgment Relief 
To overcome the practical obstacle of crafting a decree where the 
President has taken no action, congressional plaintiffs might ask a 
federal court simply to issue a declaratory judgment,136 that the 
President or an executive agency under the President’s direction, had 
violated the Administrative Procedure Act by failing to act.137 
 
 134. Such an approach has storied antecedent in the law of remedies. When a singer 
violated her contract to perform, the impresario could not obtain an injunction compelling 
her to sing, but could prevent her from singing in another music hall. Lumley v. Wagner 
(1852) 42 Eng. Rep. 687, 687, 1 DeG., M & G. 604, 604. 
 135. Where the relief requested is very specific, a court can fashion an order that will 
result in compliance. See, e.g., Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 37–40 (1975). That 
was the situation in Train v. City of New York, where the federal grant to New York City 
was ready to be issued, but was held up by the President’s order. Id. Unlocking that order 
was all that was needed for New York City to obtain relief. See id. at 40. In any case 
involving more complex action, however, a court would be involved in an impossible task 
of monitoring the executive’s compliance. Lumley v. Wagner is once again instructive: the 
court could not order an opera singer to sing as required by her contract with the music 
hall, since she might intentionally perform poorly. Lumley, 42 Eng. Rep. at 687, 1 DeG., M 
& G. at 604. That is why the English court ordered the equitable relief not of ordering her 
to sing, but of preventing her from singing elsewhere. Id. 
 136. See Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §	2201(a) (2012) (“In a case of 
actual controversy within its jurisdiction	.	.	.	any court of the United States, upon the filing 
of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any 
interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be 
sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree 
and shall be reviewable as such.”) 
 137. A purely advisory opinion is not permitted to federal courts because of the federal 
judiciary’s restriction to “cases and controversies,” U.S. CONST. art III, §	2. What keeps a 
declaratory judgment from being considered such an advisory opinion is the presence of 
specific parties, with a specific dispute against each other. In MedImmune, Inc. v. 
Genentech, Inc., the Court explained the difference by stating that 
[t]here was a time when this Court harbored doubts about the compatibility of 
declaratory-judgment actions with Article III’s case-or-controversy 
requirement.	.	.	.	We dispelled those doubts, however, in Nashville, C. & St. L. R. 
Co. v. Wallace, holding (in a case involving a declaratory judgment rendered in 
state court) that an appropriate action for declaratory relief can be a case or 
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Alternatively, a complaint might be permitted that the President had 
failed to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”138 Would 
such a declaration constitute sufficient redress of the plaintiffs’ injury 
as to satisfy Article III’s requirement of a case or controversy? 
The answer should be yes, where the executive branch has made 
clear its intention not to enforce the law.139 By way of illustration, 
suppose a President fails to take some action on the grounds that 
taking such action would be unconstitutional.140 A declaratory 
judgment could be sought by the Congress that the President 
enforcing the law would, in fact, not be unconstitutional—so long as 
the context was in a specific circumstance of a Presidential failure to 
act, the “case or controversy” requirement of Article III, section 2, 
 
controversy under Article III. The federal Declaratory Judgment Act was signed 
into law the following year, and we upheld its constitutionality in Aetna Life Ins. 
Co. v. Haworth.	.	.	.	Aetna and the cases following it do not draw the brightest of 
lines between those declaratory-judgment actions that satisfy the case-or-
controversy requirement and those that do not. Our decisions have required that 
the dispute be “definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having 
adverse legal interests”; and that it be “real and substantial” and “admi[t] of 
specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an 
opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.” In 
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co. we summarized as follows: 
“Basically, the question in each case is whether the facts alleged, under all the 
circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having 
adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance 
of a declaratory judgment.” 
549 U.S. 118, 126–127 (2007) (citations omitted). 
 138. U.S. CONST. art. II, §	3. The Supreme Court ordered briefing on this issue in the 
case challenging President Obama’s failure to deport categories of individuals deportable 
under the law: the “[p]etition for a writ of certiorari is granted. In addition to the questions 
presented by the petition, the parties are directed to brief and argue the following 
question: ‘Whether the Guidance violates the Take Care Clause of the Constitution, Art. 
II, §	3.’	” United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 906, 906 (2016) (mem.) (referring to the 
Deferred Action for Parents of Americans “guidance” under which a class of parents of 
children born in America not otherwise legally present would receive an assurance they 
would not be deported). The Court subsequently issued a per curiam opinion affirming the 
judgment by an equally divided court. United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2271–72 
(2016) (mem.). 
 139. Love and Garg correctly observe that it would be very difficult to distinguish 
inaction from slow action, or just tacit nonenforcement. Love & Garg, supra note 1, at 
1228. As Price makes clear, however, it is the flagrant, announced instances of 
nonenforcement that do the most damage to the Constitution’s separation of powers. 
Price, supra note 21, at 1138. But cf. Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 86, at 357 (arguing 
transparency of nonenforcement policy is a virtue). So if we allow declaratory relief in that 
subset of cases where the executive has been explicit (which comprises most of the recent 
instances of executive nonaction that have given rise to complaint—in the areas of 
immigration, and marijuana, for instance), we will have accomplished much. 
 140. See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 1, at 836. 
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would be met.141 Once that issue was resolved at the level of the U.S. 
Supreme Court, if the President persisted in failing to perform the 
requested action, such an attitude would more clearly approach 
dereliction of duty than if there had not been such a court ruling.142 
The Court’s role would be to say whether or not the law was 
constitutional, a function squarely within the judicial role to “say what 
the law is.”143 Whether or not the President’s failure to enforce a law 
would be grounds for an impeachment is the House of 
Representatives’ prerogative.144 The Court making a holding on 
 
 141. To take an actual illustration, consider the facts in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 
(1983). Chadha, an alien who had illegally overstayed his visa, had nevertheless been 
allowed to stay in the United States by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Id. at 
923–24. However, pursuant to a law that gave each house of Congress the right to overturn 
a stay of deportation by the executive branch, the House of Representatives had ordered 
Mr. Chadha’s deportation. Id. at 925–26. The Board of Immigration Appeals ruled it 
lacked jurisdiction to strike down the law that the House had utilized, so it ordered the 
deportation. Id. at 928. Mr. Chadha appealed the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision 
to the circuit court, which held unconstitutional the law under which the House had acted. 
Id. At that point, both sides (Mr. Chadha, and the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, the parent agency of the Board of Immigration Appeals) were on the same side. 
The circuit court had afforded them both the relief they each sought: a stay of Mr. 
Chadha’s deportation. Id. The INS wanted to appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court to obtain 
a definitive ruling that the law was unconstitutional. Id. at 928–29. Mr. Chadha was safe; 
what INS wanted was in essence a declaratory judgment that the statute was, indeed, 
unconstitutional. All other relief had been granted: Mr. Chadha’s deportation had been 
suspended. Id. at 928. The Supreme Court entertained the appeal, claiming sufficient 
adversity existed to constitute a “case or controversy” by reason of the intervention at the 
appellate level by the House of Representatives—long after the rulings by the 
Immigration Judge, and the Bureau of Immigration Appeals, of which Mr. Chadha had 
complained. 462 U.S. at 939 & n.5. The logic of INS v. Chadha, therefore, supports the 
conclusion that a declaratory judgment action to rule some governmental action 
unconstitutional is sufficient to constitute a case or controversy, for Article III, section 2 
purposes, so long as a specific set of facts and parties is before the court. U.S. CONST. art. 
III, §	2. 
 142. In Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000), the D.C. Circuit denied 
standing to members of Congress seeking declaratory judgment that President Clinton had 
violated the War Powers Act and the U.S. Constitution by his military actions in Kosovo. 
Id. at 24. In listing alternative remedies available to the House members, Judge Silberman 
said, “[T]here always remains the possibility of impeachment should a President act in 
disregard of Congress’ authority on these matters.” Id. at 23. 
 143. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 144. U.S. CONST. art. I, §	2, cl. 5. It is entirely permissible, even admirable, for a 
President to insist on his own view that a law is unconstitutional, even if the courts have 
held that it is constitutional. It remains with the House of Representatives to decide 
whether the President’s insistence is pretextual, or worthy of respect even if different from 
the view of the courts. This framework has been described by noting that  
[t]he Constitution establishes a belt, suspender, and rope approach to its defense, 
with Congress, the courts, the states, the people, and the President all having roles 
to play. Congress should consider the constitutionality of the bills it debates; the 
courts must do the same when presented with a claim of unconstitutionality; and 
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constitutionality, therefore, does not intrude into the authority of a 
co-equal branch, which would violate the political question 
doctrine.145 
The President might change his approach of nonenforcement in 
the face of such a declaratory judgment. If failing to see enforcement 
of a law it passed constitutes cognizable “concrete and particularized 
injury” to the Congress—a point on which there is dispute146—then 
the likelihood that a declaratory judgment would lead the President 
to start enforcing the law would satisfy the justiciability requirements 
set out by the U.S. Supreme Court.147 
D. Qui Tam Actions 
Another possible judicial means of redress for the executive’s 
failure to enforce a law is in a qui tam action by a private party under 
the False Claims Act.148 If an expenditure of money has occurred that 
is contrary to law, but the President has not enforced the law that 
would have prohibited that payment of money, a private party can 
 
the people must decide whether their agents have been faithful to the 
Constitution. The fact that the President has multiple means of defending the 
Constitution and thereby satisfying his oath is hardly surprising. 
Devins & Prakash, supra note 1, at 537. 
 145. The Supreme Court has explained this, stating that 
[r]esolution of litigation challenging the constitutional authority of one of the 
three branches cannot be evaded by courts because the issues have political 
implications in the sense urged by Congress. Marbury v. Madison was also a 
“political” case, involving as it did claims under a judicial commission alleged to 
have been duly signed by the President but not delivered. But “courts cannot 
reject as ‘no law suit’ a bona fide controversy as to whether some action 
denominated ‘political’ exceeds constitutional authority.” 
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 943 (citations omitted). 
 146. See infra Section V.B.1–.2. Three Supreme Court cases have come to different 
conclusions on legislators’ standing. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939), granted 
standing to state legislators whose votes were sufficient to stop a result, when the result 
was allowed to happen anyway. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997), denied standing to a 
U.S. Senator who complained about the change in the legislative system wrought by a law 
giving the President the line-item veto. Id. at 815–18. Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona 
Independent Redistricting Commission, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015), granted standing to state 
legislators complaining that a citizens’ initiative had taken away their redistricting power. 
Id. at 2658–59. Raines, the case that denied standing, actually contained the most 
accommodating language to the claim that legislators who passed a law would have 
standing to sue when the law was not enforced; but that phrasing was not necessary to the 
holding of the case. See Raines, 521 U.S. at 815–17. But see Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 
697, 701–02 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (mem.). 
 147. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516–17 (2007). 
 148. 31 U.S.C. §§	3729–33 (2012). 
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present a demand to the executive to do so.149 When rebuffed, the 
private party can then proceed to court on his or her own to prove the 
illegal payment, keeping a portion of the eventual judgment as reward 
for having vindicated the public interest.150 Not every instance of 
executive nonaction, of course, will involve a payment of money from 
the federal treasury. Where those circumstances are met, however, 
the law can be enforced by a “private attorney general” in a qui tam 
action.151 
In a qui tam situation, an actual case or controversy exists 
because a fraud has occurred. The False Claims Act is violated 
because of the payment of money to someone not entitled to it.152 The 
redress is the payment of three times the money owed to the 
government, and a fine,153 as well as the kind of recovery available in 
civil litigation.154 The executive’s failure to act is not technically cured; 
a qui tam court does not order the executive branch to enforce the 
law against other miscreants in the future. However, as in the case of 
the negative injunction discussed above, qui tam cases indirectly 
vindicate congressional desire to enforce the False Claims Act 
expansively when the President does not choose to enforce it.155 
One illustration of a potentially successful action under the False 
Claims Act would be that of a qui tam action brought by a citizen 
complaining of a bill to be paid to a private contractor for the 
Department of Defense, transporting soldiers to fight in a war that 
was illegal either as a violation of the War Powers Resolution, or as 
because Congress did not declare war, as the U.S. Constitution 
requires.156 
Drawing together the previous two Sections, I conclude that 
courts are capable of deciding when executive action or inaction is 
 
 149. Id. §	3730(b)(2). 
 150. Id. §	3730(d)(1)–(2). 
 151. Cf. Cook Cty. v. United States ex rel Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 122 (2003). Despite 
the False Claims Act, the executive branch might stymie enforcement of some qui tam 
claims by failing to confiscate property in question, an issue on which there has not been 
recent jurisprudence. See Price, supra note 1, at 714–15, 721–22 (discussing the 
Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454 (1868)). 
 152. 31 U.S.C. §	3729 (2012). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. §	3730. 
 155. Cook Cty, 538 U.S. at 129 (“Congress wrote expansively, meaning ‘to reach all 
types of fraud, without qualification, that might result in financial loss to the 
Government.’	”) (citing United States v. NeifertWhite Co., 390 U.S. 228, 232 (1968)). 
 156. The False Claims Acts states that “any person who	.	.	.	knowingly presents, or 
causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval” violates the 
False Claims Act. 31 U.S.C. §	3729 (a)(1)(A). It further explains that “the terms ‘knowing’ 
and ‘knowingly’	.	.	.	require no proof of specific intent to defraud.” Id. §	3729(b)(1)(B).  
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unlawful and of ordering meaningful relief that would likely alter 
executive behavior. However, federal courts can only act in an actual 
case or controversy and that requires finding a party with standing to 
bring the case to court. It is to that question that I now turn. 
V.  STANDING 
Either private individuals hurt by executive action, or the 
legislature that passed a law which the executive failed to enforce, 
might have standing to challenge the executive.  
A. Individual, Nongovernment Parties 
Individual parties who have been harmed by executive action 
alleged to have infringed on the rights of Congress have standing to 
sue. Examples of such include a soldier ordered to go to war without 
a congressional declaration of war or resolution under the War 
Powers Act,157 or conservative nonprofit public policy advocates 
whom the IRS subjected to more stringent review than other 
groups.158 The remedy, if the executive action is illegal, is to cease the 
executive action.159 Sometimes there will be individual parties who 
have been harmed by executive inaction of sufficient specificity that 
they can obtain relief: the child whose parents wanted “Jerusalem, 
Israel” on his passport;160 or New York City, which had its EPA grant 
impounded by the Nixon administration.161 There will be other cases, 
however, without individual parties with adequate standing to 
complain of executive inaction. In such circumstances, a judicial 
remedy can only be fashioned if legislators bring suit. 
 
 157. Campbell v. Clinton, 52 F. Supp. 2d 34, 43 n.8 (D.D.C. 1999), aff’d, 203 F.3d 19 
(D.C. Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 815 (2000). 
 158. See Freedom Path, Inc. v. Lerner, No. 3:14-CV-1537-D, 2016 WL 3015392, at *5 
(N.D. Tex. May 25, 2016). 
 159. The archetypical case is SEC v. Chenery Corporation, 318 U.S. 80 (1943), wherein 
the Court sustained the appellate court’s decision to set aside the order of the SEC, an 
executive branch agency, at the request of the party aggrieved by the SEC’s order. Id. at 
95. 
 160. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1424–25 (2012). 
 161. Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 47 (1975). 
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B. Legislative Standing 
1.  New Language in Future Statutes to Help Congress Establish 
Standing 
Where members of Congress have sought a judicial remedy for 
presidential actions in recent years, the President has often won on 
the basis that the case is nonjusticiable because the Congressmembers 
lack standing.162 Nonjusticiability has a constitutional basis in the 
requirement that the federal judicial power extends to “cases” and 
“controversies,” not hypothetical questions.163 It also has a prudential 
component.164 Congress can use its authority to set the jurisdiction of 
 
 162. Some commentators have concluded that the challenges to congressional standing 
are insurmountable. See, e.g., Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 1, at 786. These commentators 
base their opinions on a string of cases that give a basis for such a conclusion. See generally 
Chenoweth v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 112 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (denying standing to 
congressmembers suing over President Clinton’s designation of environmentally protected 
rivers); Kucinich v. Obama, 821 F. Supp. 2d 110 (D.D.C., 2011) (denying standing to 
congressmembers suing over President Obama’s going to war in Libya); Campbell, 52 F. 
Supp. 2d 34 (denying standing to congressmembers suing over President Clinton’s going to 
war in Yugoslavia without Congressional approval). But see U.S. House of 
Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 77 (D.D.C. 2015) (granting standing to the 
House of Representatives challenging the Secretary of HHS’ subsidizing health insurers 
without an appropriation from Congress). 
 163. U.S. CONST. art. III, §	2. See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361–62. 
(1911). 
 164. This is described in the Windsor opinion, which states  
[there is a] distinction between two principles: the jurisdictional requirements of 
Article III and the prudential limits on its exercise. The latter are “essentially 
matters of judicial self-governance.” The Court has kept these two strands 
separate: “Article III standing, which enforces the Constitution’s case-or-
controversy requirement; and prudential standing, which embodies ‘judicially self-
imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction[.]’	” 
United States v. Winsdor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2685 (2013) (citations omitted). Lower courts 
have also written about this prudential element:  
The most satisfactory means of translating our separation-of-powers concerns into 
principled decisionmaking is through a doctrine of circumscribed equitable 
discretion.	.	.	.	The standard would counsel the courts to refrain from hearing cases 
which represent the most obvious intrusion by the judiciary into the legislative 
arena: challenges concerning congressional action or inaction regarding legislation. 
Yet this standard would assure that non-frivolous claims of unconstitutional action 
which could only be brought by members of Congress will be reviewed on the 
merits.	.	.	.	We would welcome congressional plaintiff actions involving non-
frivolous claims of unconstitutional action which, because they could not be 
brought by a private plaintiff and are not subject to legislative redress, would go 
unreviewed unless brought by a legislative plaintiff. In this last situation, there are 
no prudential considerations or separation-of-powers concerns which would 
outweigh the mandate of the federal courts to “say what the law is.”  
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federal courts165 to overcome judicial resistance to hearing cases based 
on prudential, nonconstitutional, considerations by adding language 
like the following to any law it passes: 
To enforce the provisions of this act, either house of Congress 
shall, upon passage of a resolution of that house, have standing 
to the maximum extent constitutionally permissible to pursue a 
declaratory judgment against the appropriate executive branch 
employee, department, or agency, and no court shall dismiss 
such action except on the grounds of unconstitutionality.166 
 
Riegle v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 881–82 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (citation 
omitted). 
 165. U.S. CONST. art. III, §	2, cl. 2.  
 166. Judge McGowan advised that such congressional circumscription of a federal 
court’s equitable discretion to refuse to hear a legislator’s challenge would be within 
Congress’ power:  
The decision by Congress to remove a federal court’s discretion to award a 
declaratory judgment should not raise any constitutional concerns, Even if 
Congress stipulates that the courts lack discretion in one particular subject area, 
the courts are still free to reject the claim on the merits. The freedom of the 
federal courts to reach a decision either way on the merits avoids the 
constitutional infirmities discussed in United States v. Klein. The power of 
Congress over a federal court’s equitable discretion is a more murky question. It 
can be argued that such discretion is part of the ‘judicial power’ and therefore can 
be exercised only by the tribunal from which an equitable remedy is sought. On 
the other hand, if it is constitutional for Congress to withdraw a federal court’s 
equitable powers, the relatively less-intrusive act of requiring courts to grant an 
equitable remedy to a prevailing party might seem part of Congress’s power over 
the lower federal courts granted by Article I, section 8 of the Constitution.  
Carl McGowan, Congressmen in Court: The New Plaintiffs, 15 GA. L. REV. 241, 264–65 
nn.89–90 (1981) (citations omitted). 
  Professor Harrison, by contrast, argues that enacting such a law would be beyond 
Congress’ authority, as it would interfere with the executive branch’s duty to enforce the 
law. John Harrison, Legislative Power, Executive Duty, and Legislative Lawsuits, 31 J.L. & 
POL. 103, 115 (2015). 
  Judge McGowan has the better side of the argument; Professor Harrison proves 
too much when he claims giving Congress the right to sue results in impermissible 
supervision of the executive. Id. at 116 (“Requiring that officers perform their legal duties 
is a form of supervision.”). I agree, but the supervision is by the court, not by the plaintiff. 
A private party, with standing, all would concede, suing the executive to perform a 
function beneficial to that party does not supervise the executive, but asks a court to 
supervise the executive. The same is true in a lawsuit by the Congress. It would be asking 
the judicial branch to supervise the executive branch insofar as the executive branch has 
failed in a statutory or constitutional duty. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 696–97 
(1974). See also Jonathan Remy Nash, A Functional Theory of Congressional Standing, 
114 MICH. L. REV. 339, 346 n.36 (2015) (“Unlike Article III standing, prudential standing 
is not grounded in the Constitution; doctrines of prudential standing are generated by the 
courts, and Congress remains free to revise and override them.”) (citing Warth v. Seldin, 
422 U.S. 490, 500–01 (1975)); cf. James A. Turner, Comment, The Post-Medellín Case for 
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While Congress cannot create a justiciable case where there is no 
specific harm or party aggrieved, the Court has recently spoken 
deferentially of Congress’ special ability to identify harm that a court 
might not otherwise have found. In ruling that an individual could 
have standing to sue a credit reporting agency for an error in its 
report about him, the Court explicitly showed deference to Congress’ 
judgment in the Fair Credit Reporting Act167 that intangible harms 
were cognizable.168 Further, the court explained 
[i]n addition, because Congress is well positioned to identify 
intangible harms that meet minimum Article III requirements, 
its judgment is also instructive and important. Thus, we said in 
Lujan that Congress may “elevat[e] to the status of legally 
cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were 
previously inadequate in law.” Similarly, Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence in that case explained that “Congress has the 
power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that 
will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed 
before.”169 
Thus, if Congress were to add the language this Article suggests 
to future legislation, it should substantially advance its claim to 
standing to sue for the intangible harm of executive nonaction. 
2.  Supreme Court Precedent for Legislators’ Standing 
The modern starting point for Supreme Court holdings on 
legislators’ standing is Coleman v. Miller.170 Coleman granted standing 
to a majority of Kansas state senators to challenge the effect of the 
lieutenant governor’s vote to break a tie in the Kansas Senate, which 
resulted in the ratification by Kansas of an amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution to allow Congress to prohibit child labor.171 In 2015, in 
Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting 
 
Legislative Standing, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 731, 747–48 (2010) (collecting authorities on both 
sides). 
 167. 15 U.S.C. §	1681 (2012).  
 168. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016). 
 169. Id. But see id. at 1547–48 (“Injury in fact is a constitutional requirement, and ‘[i]t 
is settled that Congress cannot erase Article III’s standing requirements by statutorily 
granting the right to sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing.’	”) 
(citations omitted). 
 170. 307 U.S. 433 (1939). 
 171. Id. at 446. The amendment was proposed in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
ruling that Congress lacked authority to ban child labor. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 
251, 276–77 (1918) overturned by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). The 
amendment was never adopted, as Darby rendered it unnecessary. Darby, 312 U.S. 116–
17. 
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Commission,172 the Court affirmed its holding in Coleman. Arizona 
Independent Redistricting Commission granted standing to the 
Arizona State Legislature as an institution to challenge the creation 
of an independent commission to perform the redistricting function 
that the legislature believed was reserved for them under the U.S. 
Constitution: 
Coleman, as we later explained in Raines, stood “for the 
proposition that legislators whose votes would have been 
sufficient to defeat (or enact) a specific legislative Act have 
standing to sue if that legislative action goes into effect (or does 
not go into effect), on the ground that their votes have been 
completely nullified.”173 
Under this formulation, the legislative branch would have 
standing to sue when the executive branch fails to enforce a law, in 
other words, when “legislative action	.	.	.	does not go into effect.”174 
The Raines Court’s phrasing of the test, quoted in Arizona 
Independent Redistricting Commission, was, however, broader than 
the facts of the case in Coleman, where the action of the state senate 
prevented a result that was implemented anyway.175 What is of 
interest for the purposes of this Article is the converse: where action 
the legislative branch desires is not taken by the executive. The quote 
from Raines, repromulgated in Arizona Independent Redistricting 
Commission, is obiter dicta as to the instance of executive nonaction.  
Further, while the test announced in Raines holds legislators’ 
interests in seeing their laws enforced to be sufficient, the decision 
itself was against legislative standing, as will be discussed below. 
There has not been a Supreme Court decision on the question of 
legislative standing in the context of executive inaction. Is it safe, 
therefore, to rely on the Raines’ rephrasing of Coleman that holds 
legislators’ interests in seeing their laws enforced to be adequate for 
standing? 
 
 172. 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015). 
 173. Id. at 2665. 
 174. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 823 (1997). 
 175. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 446. See U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. 
Supp. 3d 53, 77 (D.D.C. 2015) (granting standing to the House of Representatives 
challenging the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services’ (“HHS”) 
subsidizing health insurers without an appropriation from Congress). Burwell, like 
Coleman, presents facts where action took place contrary to what the legislative branch 
had wished, not where the complaint was over executive nonaction. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 
438; Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d at 57–66. 
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The conclusion I reach below is that Coleman remains good law; 
but, since it is not controlling precedent, it would be wise for 
Congress to identify a more particularized harm than simply wanting 
to see its laws enforced to enhance the prospect of congressional 
standing when challenging executive inaction. 
3.  Raines Decision Does Not Vitiate Coleman 
Coleman was distinguished in Raines v. Byrd.176 In Raines, 
Congress had passed a law giving the President line-item veto 
authority over budgets.177 Senator Robert Byrd had voted against the 
law; and when it passed, he sued claiming the line-item veto had 
undercut his authority as a senator.178 The Supreme Court denied 
standing to Senator Byrd.179 In Arizona Independent Redistricting 
Commission, Raines was explicitly preserved.180 
There are several points of distinction between Coleman and 
Raines. In Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, the Court 
noted prominently one key distinction: the plaintiffs in Coleman 
constituted a majority of the legislative branch whose rights were 
being asserted;181 in Raines, the plaintiffs were only six individual 
members of Congress.182 Hence, where Congress as an institution183 
 
 176. Raines, 521 U.S. at 821–22. 
 177. Id. at 814. 
 178. Id. at 816. 
 179. Id. at 830. 
 180. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2658, 2665 
(2015). 
 181. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 435–36 (1939) 
 182. Raines, 521 U.S. at 814. The small number of members of Congress suing was 
significant to the holding of the case: 
[A] dispositive factor in the D.C. Circuit’s standing analysis, and subsequently 
Arizona State Legislature’s analysis, centers around the number of members that 
sued. The D.C. Circuit rejected legislator standing because the members suing did 
not constitute a majority. But instances in which a majority of Senate or House 
members sue over presidential non-enforcement seemingly would satisfy the D.C. 
Circuit and the Arizona State Legislature’s standing threshold.  
Bethany R. Pickett, Note, Will the Real Lawmakers Please Stand Up: Congressional 
Standing in Instances of Presidential Nonenforcement, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 439, 467 (2016) 
(footnotes omitted). 
 183. Raines, 521 U.S. at 829 (stating that “[w]e attach some importance to the fact that 
appellees have not been authorized to represent their respective Houses of Congress in 
this action, and indeed both Houses actively oppose their suit”). In Burwell, the district 
court judge put emphasis on the fact that the House had authorized the lawsuit; it was not 
brought simply by individual members. U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. 
Supp. 3d 53, 67 (D.D.C. 2015). That it was the House alone rather than Congress was 
identified as a possible issue, but not an impediment, in the court’s opinion. If my theory is 
accepted that the House would have standing to seek a declaratory judgment regarding 
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seeks a declaratory judgment that the President has failed to enforce 
a law, all the standing requirements would be met.184 
Another point of distinction between Coleman and Raines is 
that, as the Court saw Raines, Senator Byrd lost a legislative vote, and 
went to court to try to have another chance.185 By contrast, any action 
 
the President’s action or nonaction, because of the House’s constitutional role in 
impeachment, see discussion infra Section V.B.4, a resolution of the House alone should 
be sufficient. There are other, limited, instances where prerogatives of the legislative 
branch are enjoyed by less than a full majority of both houses, and in those instances, 
standing should be available to the number of House or Senate members requisite to the 
power being asserted. In Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1978), vacated, 444 
U.S. 996 (1979), for instance, one-third plus one of the senators should have been granted 
standing, since the premise of the action was that the power of one-third of the Senate to 
hold up ratification of a treaty had been eviscerated by the President’s action. Id. at 697. 
Similarly, in Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000), one half of one house, plus 
one, should have been enough to grant standing, since that vote would have been 
sufficient to prevent a declaration of war from passing. See also Kerr v. Hickenlooper, 824 
F.3d 1207, 1212–13 (10th Cir. 2016). Upon remand from the Supreme Court following 
Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, the Tenth Circuit reversed its earlier 
holding of standing for individual Colorado legislators, distinguishing them from the 
Colorado Legislature as an institution. Kerr v. Hickenlooper, 744 F.3d 1156 (10th Cir. 
2014), vacated and remanded, 135 S. Ct. 2927 (2015). 
 184. A declaration by Congress authorizing a lawsuit would have the additional benefit 
of insuring that there is, in fact, a live controversy between the legislative and executive 
branches regarding the public policy behind the law not being enforced. Professor 
Sant’Ambrogio considers Presidential nonenforcement as a potentially beneficial practice 
where public favor regarding a law has changed in the intervening years, yet structural 
impediments prevent a repeal. See Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 86, at 377. By restricting 
standing to the Congress (or one house of Congress), when it has taken a vote to authorize 
the lawsuit, we can preserve that virtue, yet allow the judicial resolution of a true inter-
branch dispute. Further, requiring such a resolution of authorization solves the logical 
question of whether the current Congress is harmed by nonenforcement of a statute 
passed by an earlier Congress. See Harrison, supra note 166, at 114 (insisting that the 
plaintiff be Congress, or one house thereof, also serves to limit the number of cases that 
will be brought, as compared to allowing any individual member of Congress the right to 
sue); Stern, supra note 1, at 45 (opposing legislative standing because, among other 
reasons, of the potential multiplicity of lawsuits). 
  Dicta in several cases suggests the necessity, though not necessarily the 
sufficiency, of a formal authorizing vote for Congressional standing: “[T]his case, in which 
neither a House of Congress nor any congressional committee has issued a subpoena for 
the disputed information or authorized this suit, is not the setting for such unprecedented 
judicial action.” Walker v. Cheney, 230 F. Supp. 2d 51, 53 (D.D.C. 2002) (denying standing 
to the General Accounting Office, an arm of Congress, to obtain information from the 
Vice President regarding an executive branch task force); see also Senate Select Comm. on 
Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 727. (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc) 
(footnote omitted) (stating that “[w]hile the appeal was pending, the Senate on November 
2 passed a resolution stating that the Select Committee is authorized to subpoena and sue 
the President and that the Committee, in subpoenaing and suing the President, was acting 
with valid legislative purposes and seeking information vital to the fulfillment of its 
legitimate legislative functions”). 
 185. Raines, 521 U.S. at 824. 
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by a house of Congress complaining about a President’s failure to 
enforce a law is to vindicate a winning legislative vote. Therefore, 
when Congress asks a court to direct executive action on a validly 
passed law, there is no concern that members of Congress are 
attempting to win judicially what they could not win legislatively.186 
There is one other reason Raines should not preclude Congress 
from suing for declaratory relief when the President fails to enforce a 
law: the Court mischaracterized the harm of which Senator Byrd 
complained. The plaintiff members of Congress, the Court reasoned, 
“have not alleged that they voted for a specific bill, that there were 
sufficient votes to pass the bill, and that the bill was nonetheless 
deemed defeated. In the vote on the Act, their votes were given full 
effect. They simply lost that vote.”187 Byrd’s complaint was not that he 
lost a vote on the legislation that created the line-item veto; he 
complained that, with the line-item veto in place, his powers as a 
legislator would be diminished.188 Although Senator Byrd did not 
bring up this specific example, one way of seeing how his powers were 
diminished by the line-item veto is to consider a bill combining 
something Senator Byrd wanted but the President did not, along with 
many other provisions the President did want.189 After the line-item 
 
 186. A clear articulation of this argument is that 
any intrusion by the judiciary into a dispute between its coequal branches seems 
fraught with difficulties. The problems are multiplied when the plaintiff could have 
obtained from Congress the substantial equivalent of the judicial relief sought, 
because in such cases the court is asked to intrude into the internal functioning of 
the legislative branch itself. 
McGowan, supra note 166, at 242. See id. at 250 n.37, 263 (citing a congressman’s 
challenge to the nonpresidentially appointed status of members of the Federal Reserve’s 
Open Market Committee after failing in his attempt to amend the law to require such 
appointment); see also Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461, 468 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 
U.S. 997 (1978)). 
 187. Raines, 521 U.S. at 824. 
 188. Describing Senator Byrd’s complaint as viewed by the court of appeals, the 
Supreme Court in Raines said 
[t]he court held that appellees’ claim that the Act “dilute[d] their Article I voting 
power” was sufficient to confer Article III standing: “[Appellees’] votes mean 
something different from what they meant before, for good or ill, and [appellees] 
who perceive it as the latter are thus ‘injured’ in a constitutional sense whenever 
an appropriations bill comes up for a vote, whatever the President ultimately does 
with it.	.	.	. Under the Act the dynamic of lawmaking is fundamentally altered. 
Compromises and trade-offs by individual lawmakers must take into account the 
President’s item-by-item cancellation power looming over the end product.” 
521 U.S. at 817 (quoting Byrd v. Byrd, 956 F. Supp. 25, 31 (D.D.C. 1997)). 
 189. See generally TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33667, 
PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL 
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veto became possible, such a legislative approach would be 
unavailing. Thus, properly understood, Senator Byrd’s position in 
Raines should have been enough to grant him standing because his 
structural legislative powers had been diminished. This institutional 
slight to Congress was the premise under which the line-item veto was 
eventually struck down by the Supreme Court, when the lawsuit was 
brought not by a U.S. senator, but by New York City (one of its 
federal grants had been line-item vetoed by President Clinton).190 
Coleman lives, revived by Arizona Independent Redistricting 
Commission. This Article does not ignore that the Court took pains in 
the latter case to say it was ruling only in the context of a state 
legislature’s suit, not a suit by Congress, and that separation of 
powers issues would be presented in the case of a congressional suit 
against the President not presented in the state legislature’s lawsuit 
against a state commission.191 Deference to states’ authority to sort 
out their own powers, however, was the basis for the holding on the 
merits in Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission. Such a 
federalism concern suggests strongly that the Court be more 
circumspect of inserting itself into a claim by state legislators against 
other organs of state government192 than it would be to resolve a 
dispute between the two branches of the federal government.193 The 
 
IMPLICATIONS (2012), www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33667.pdf [https://perma.cc/4K6Z-
5XKQ] (noting the constitutional implications of a line-item veto). 
 190. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448 (1998). 
 191. Id. at 2665 n.12. Contrast this view with Justice Breyer’s dissent: “While I 
recognize the existence of potential differences between state and federal legislators, I do 
not believe that those differences would be determinative here, where constitutional, not 
prudential, considerations are at issue.” Raines, 521 U.S. at 843; see also Stern, supra note 
1, at 41–42. 
 192. The defendant in Coleman v. Miller was an employee of the Kansas Senate; the 
plaintiffs were Kansas state senators. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 433 (1939). One 
might have thought it appropriate for the U.S. Supreme Court to leave the resolution of 
the dispute to the Kansas Senate, which could have ordered its employee to send a notice 
to the U.S. Congress to disregard the previous notice of ratification of the proposed U.S. 
Constitutional amendment. Id. at 436. The D.C. Circuit, in dicta in Campbell v. Clinton, 
tried to evade that conclusion by speculating, without more, that such a notice might not 
have been accepted by the Congress. Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 22–23 (D.C. Cir. 
2000). If that were so, however, the Coleman court should have dismissed the case as 
moot. 
 193. If a subsequent U.S. Supreme Court ruling advances this distinction—denying 
standing to federal legislators, while having granted it to state legislators—a federalism-
based desire not to judge other branches of the national government is a weak reed on 
which to base such different approaches. The Court has frequently considered itself to be 
competent to resolve competing institutional powers of the three federal branches, when 
legislators were not plaintiffs. For consideration of the absence of reluctance shown by the 
Supreme Court to insert itself in interbranch disputes, see generally Clinton v. City of New 
York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (discussing Congress ceding a line-item veto to the President); 
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Court has adopted a standing rule to allow a state legislature to seek 
relief against the usurpation of its power.194 It would be odd for the 
Court to hold the Congress could not avail itself of the same relief.195 
At any rate, it has not done so. 
4.  Kennedy v. Sampson: The Closest Case on Point 
None of the foregoing cases on legislative standing, however, 
deals with a law passed by Congress that the President fails to 
enforce. Only one court decision is on point, the D.C. Circuit’s 
opinion in Kennedy v. Sampson,196 though two others have some 
similarity.197 In Kennedy, Senator Ted Kennedy voted in favor of a 
 
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (involving the President’s power to remove 
members from a judicial organ, the U.S. Sentencing Commission); Morrison v. Olson, 487 
U.S. 654 (1988) (regarding the authority for Congress to create a special prosecutor 
outside the direction of the President); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (concerning 
the President’s deferring to one house of Congress that purported to veto his decision to 
parole individuals from deportation). Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) 
(enforcing a subpoena as a judicial instrument, against the President in a criminal 
investigation). See generally Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (noting that the Court 
reached the merits of a case regarding proper executive and legislative roles in budget 
rescissions, though reserving on the specific issue of congressional standing).  
 194. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2665 
(2015); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 455–56 (1938). 
 195. For this reason, in his dissent in Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, 
Justice Scalia opined that no legislator, state or federal, should have standing; he reserved 
special venom for Coleman, attempting to claim it was not actually a majority holding of 
the Court. See Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comn’n, 135 S. Ct. at 2696 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
The majority explicitly ruled against his point of view. Id. at 2665 & n.13 (majority). 
 196. 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The D.C Circuit found standing. Id. at 436. At this 
time, prior to Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997), the D.C. Circuit was predisposed to 
legislator standing. For discussion of the D.C. Circuit’s peregrinations on legislative 
standing, including its adoption of equitable discretion regarding whether or not to grant 
standing to legislators, see Riegle v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 880–81 (D.C. 
Cir. 1981). Granting Senator Kennedy standing in this case was made more powerful by 
the fact that it was not necessary to find legislator standing for there to be any review at 
all—a private party might have found standing in the facts of Kennedy. See Kennedy, 511 
F.2d at 432. A physician expecting to benefit from a grant under the Family Practice of 
Medicine Act could have brought the same suit Senator Ted Kennedy did, complaining 
that since President Nixon did not order the bill enrolled as law, the National Institutes of 
Health did not make money available as the bill required. See Public Health Service Act, 
S. 3418, 91st Cong. §	761 (1970). 
 197. The case of concern here is where the legislature acts and the executive ignores it; 
that’s why Kennedy is closest to point. Two other cases involve the situation where the 
legislature failed to act, but consequences resulted that could only come about from the 
legislature having acted. See Coleman, 307 U.S. at 433 (granting standing when the state 
senate did not approve the U.S. Constitutional Amendment, but it was sent off to the US 
Congress as though it had been approved anyway; standing granted); Campbell, 203 F.3d 
at 20–21, 24 (denying standing when Congress took a vote and decided not to declare war 
or authorize military action under the War Powers Act, but the President waged war 
anyway). 
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bill.198 It passed both houses.199 President Nixon held it until Congress 
had gone on holiday recess, and then announced he would not sign 
it.200 He did not issue a veto. The President argued that when the 
tenth day after a bill was sent to him fell within a period when 
Congress was adjourned, the bill did not become law, by reason of 
Article I, section 7, of the U.S. Constitution.201 Senator Kennedy 
argued that the holiday recess was not an adjournment that prevented 
the Congress from reconsidering it.202 Hence, the bill, having been on 
the President’s desk for more than ten days, automatically became 
law.203 
The substantive issue at bar was whether the holiday recess 
constituted an adjournment within the meaning of Article I, section 
7.204 But the standing issue turned on Senator Kennedy’s complaint 
that his interest as a senator had been negatively affected when a bill 
for which he had voted failed to be enforced by the President.205 The 
D.C. Circuit held in favor of Kennedy as to both standing and the 
merits.206 
5.  Two Kinds of Legislative Interests 
There are two kinds of interests that Congress might assert 
relevant to executive nonaction.207 The first is Congress’ interest in 
 
 198. See Kennedy, 511 F.2d at 432. 
 199. Id. at 432 & n.3. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 437. 
 203. Id. at 433. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at 436. 
 206. Id. at 433 (“Two questions are presented for review: (1) does appellee have 
standing to maintain this suit; and (2) did S. 3418 become a law? We conclude that both 
questions must be answered in the affirmative.”). Subsequently, in Goldwater v. Carter, 
the D.C. Circuit distinguished two kinds of injury a legislator might suffer, and indicated 
that the interest simply in seeing a duly passed law be enforced was not sufficiently 
institutional. Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc), judgment 
vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (mem.). The D.C. Circuit’s opinion was vacated by the 
Supreme Court, so it has no precedential value; and Kennedy v. Sampson has never been 
overruled. Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 996. See McGowan, supra note 166, at 241. 
 207. Commentators critical of legislative standing recognize this distinction, and focus 
their opposition to cases where Congress simply wants to see its policies implemented, 
rather than the narrower set of cases where Congress complains of being deprived of an 
institutional prerogative. See, e.g., Harrison, supra note 166, at 105, 110 (using the phrase 
“impair the legislative power” for the second kind of case). 
  Professor Greene notes the Third Circuit made precisely this distinction. Abner S. 
Greene, Interpretive Schizophrenia: How Congressional Standing Can Solve the Enforce-
But-Not-Defend Problem, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 577, 584–85 (2012). In Russell v. 
DeJongh, 491 F.3d 130 (3d Cir. 2007), the Third Circuit explained 
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seeing its laws enforced. Reasonable criticism has been raised about 
whether this is adequate injury for standing purposes,208 since all U.S. 
citizens have an interest in the implementation of laws that their 
representatives passed. Once the law is enacted, this point of view 
maintains, members of Congress do not possess any special interest 
separate from any of their constituents.209 Nevertheless, the phrasing 
of Coleman, embraced anew by the U.S. Supreme Court in Arizona 
Independent Redistricting Commission, would allow this interest to be 
sufficient, as explained above.210 Such an interest was also held 
sufficient by Justices Alito and Thomas in their dissent in United 
States v. Windsor,211 the case striking down the Defense of Marriage 
Act, members of Congress had intervened to represent their own 
interest in seeing the Defense of Marriage Act upheld.212 
 
[t]he principal reason for this is that once a bill has become law, a legislator’s 
interest in seeing that the law is followed is no different from a private citizen’s 
general interest in proper government.	.	.	.	The Supreme Court has “consistently 
held that a plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about 
government—claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s interest in proper 
application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly 
and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large—does not state an 
Article III case or controversy.” The courts have drawn a distinction, however, 
between a public official’s mere disobedience of a law for which a legislator 
voted—which is not an injury in fact—and an official’s “distortion of the process 
by which a bill becomes law” by nullifying a legislator’s vote or depriving a 
legislator of an opportunity to vote—which is an injury in fact. 
Id. at 135 (citations omitted). 
 208. See generally Harrison, supra note 166 (discussing various arguments for 
congressional standing); Nash, supra note 166 (arguing for limited congressional standing). 
But see, e.g., Greene, supra note 207, at 582. 
 209. Greene, supra note 207, at 585 (citing Daughtery v. Carter, 584 F.2d 1050 (D.C. 
Cir. 1978)) (“The main point was that the Congresspersons shared an interest that all 
citizens have in presidential enforcement of the law, and thus stated a generalized 
grievance, insufficient for standing.”). 
 210. See supra note 173–74 and accompanying text; see Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. 
Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2665 (2015) (explaining that “Coleman, as 
we later explained in Raines, stood ‘for the proposition that legislators whose votes would 
have been sufficient to	.	.	.	enact	.	.	.	a specific legislative Act have standing to sue if that 
legislative action	.	.	.	does not go into effect[], on the ground that their votes have been 
completely nullified.’	”). 
 211. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 212. See id.at 2695–96, 2684. In Windsor, the Court held there to be sufficient concrete 
adversity between the plaintiffs and the U.S. Treasury, which had refused to make an 
estate tax refund following the Defense of Marriage Act, even while the Justice 
Department refused to defend the Defense of Marriage Act: “the Attorney General of the 
United States notified the Speaker of the House of Representatives, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§	530D, that the Department of Justice would no longer defend the constitutionality of 
DOMA’s §	3.” Id. at 2683. Justices Alito and Thomas, however, did discuss this 
distinction, since there were congressional intervenors who claimed harm from not having 
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The second kind of interest arises when the executive nonaction 
interferes with the ability of Congress to perform its functions. This 
occurrence is closer to the actual situation in Coleman v. Miller. 
Though the defendant in that case, Mr. Miller, was the secretary of 
the Kansas Senate (an officer of the legislature, not the executive), 
the action he took prevented the Kansas senator plaintiffs from 
exercising their prerogatives under the Kansas Constitution.213 
Another illustration of this second kind of interest arises when a 
committee of Congress seeks information held by the executive 
 
the Defense of Marriage Act defended. Id. at 2712 (Alito, J., dissenting). The two justices 
admitted there was a distinction between members of Congress complaining about an 
impediment to their legislative functioning, and complaining that a law they had passed 
was not being defended by the executive branch; but they held the distinction to be 
immaterial. Id. at 2712–14. Both kinds of cases were justiciable, in those justices’ opinion. 
Id. 
  In INS v. Chadha, the Court suggested that Congress suffered a similar injury 
whenever federal legislation it had passed was struck down, noting that it had “long held 
that Congress is the proper party to defend the validity of a statute when an agency of 
government, as a defendant charged with enforcing the statute, agrees with plaintiffs that 
the statute is inapplicable or unconstitutional.” 462 U.S. 919, 940 (1983). In his dissent, 
Alito speaks to an attempted distinction between Chadha and Windsor:  
The United States attempts to distinguish Chadha on the ground that it “involved 
an unusual statute that vested the House and the Senate themselves each with 
special procedural rights—namely, the right effectively to veto Executive action.” 
But that is a distinction without a difference: just as the Court of Appeals decision 
that the Chadha Court affirmed impaired Congress’s power by striking down the 
one-house veto, so the Second Circuit’s decision here impairs Congress’s 
legislative power by striking down an Act of Congress. The United States has not 
explained why the fact that the impairment at issue in Chadha was “special” or 
“procedural” has any relevance to whether Congress suffered an injury. Indeed, 
because legislating is Congress’s central function, any impairment of that function 
is a more grievous injury than the impairment of a procedural add-on.  
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2713 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 213. 307 U.S. at 436. For other examples of this kind of interest, where legislator 
standing was upheld, see Kerr v. Hickenlooper, 744 F.3d 1156, 1157 (10th Cir. 2014), 
vacated and remanded, 135 S. Ct. 2927 (2015) (granting standing to Colorado legislators to 
challenge a voter initiative limiting the legislators’ ability to impose tax increases); Moore 
v. U.S. House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (granting standing to 
members of the House who sued Congress because a tax bill became law although it did 
not originate in the House); U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 
58 (D.D.C. 2015) (granting standing to House of Representatives to challenge expenditure 
of money by the executive branch outside of an appropriation; but denying standing 
regarding President’s suspension of applying the Affordable Care Act during 2014); U.S. 
House of Representatives v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 11 F. Supp. 2d 76, 85 (D.D.C. 1998) 
(noting that the House’s need to have correct information on population to do 
reapportionment of congressional districts with integrity was impaired by the executive 
branch’s reliance on population sampling techniques and granting standing). 
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branch important to Congress’ constitutional functions.214 In the midst 
of the Watergate investigation, Congress passed, and President Nixon 
allowed to become law without veto or signature, a statute creating 
jurisdiction in the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia for the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign 
Activities to enforce its subpoenas against the executive branch.215 
The D.C. Circuit analyzed this law in its opinion in Senate Select 
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon,216 not 
intimating any constitutional infirmity in the opinion. However, the 
D.C. Circuit upheld the trial court’s decision to quash the subpoena 
sought by the Senate committee in that case, upon a balancing of the 
equities.217 The D.C. Circuit reasoned that, balanced against the 
President’s executive privilege interests, the interest asserted by the 
Senate select committee was weaker as it was only generally 
legislative in nature. The D.C. Circuit suggested that interest of a 
 
 214. Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 1, at 1934 (footnote omitted) (explaining that “when 
Congress subpoenas an executive official and the official refuses to comply with the 
subpoena, Congress has standing to compel the executive’s compliance in court. The 
executive’s failure to produce the officer or documents injures Congress in a concrete and 
actual way”). See also Nash, supra note 166, at 374. 
  Seeking a declaratory judgment is not the same as asking a court to order the 
executive to comply with a congressional subpoena for specific information held by the 
executive. For separation of powers concerns, however, it is quite similar, involving the 
third branch to help the first branch do its duty relative to matters where the second 
branch has not been forthcoming. The Constitution does not give Congress the right to go 
to court to obtain information relative to oversight; rather, it has been inferred. Nash, 
supra note 166, at 364, 373–75. Since the Constitution does give the House the power to 
impeach, U.S. CONST. art. I, §	3; it should be an easier inference that that power 
encompasses standing to go to court when relevant to its impeachment deliberations.  
  The function of a court can be quite similar, as well. In considering whether the 
President’s nonenforcement of a statute is unlawful, a court might consult material 
produced by subpoena, regarding inter-agency communications, for instance, on why an 
enforcement action was not taken. 
  Professor Nash, in noting that the D.C. Circuit had said impeachment was an 
alternative remedy to the members suing President Clinton over his illegally commencing 
war, opined that impeachment was inappropriate. Nash, supra note 166, at 362–63, 388. 
The process of considering impeachment, however, is a broader power than impeaching, 
just as Nash argued the process of considering a vote is broader than actually voting, thus 
extending to information gathering. Id. at 363, 374–75. In advocating a functional 
approach to Congressional standing, Nash identifies two congressional interests: voting 
authority and the authority to gather information. Id. at 378, 386. But if functionalism is to 
be our guide, the authority to seek a declaratory judgment that might be of aid to the 
impeachment power should qualify as much as gathering information for possible 
legislation or oversight. 
 215. Act of Dec. 16, 1973, Pub. L. 93-190, 87 Stat. 736 (1973). 
 216. See Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 
725, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc). 
 217. Id. at 729. 
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grand jury, or the House Judiciary Committee by contrast, would 
prevail because those bodies were focused on specific crimes or 
impeachable offenses: “[t]here is a clear difference between 
Congress’s legislative tasks and the responsibility of a grand jury, or 
any institution engaged in like functions.”218 One such “institution 
engaged in like functions” was clearly the House Judiciary 
Committee, then looking into impeachment: 
In the circumstances of this case, we need neither deny that the 
Congress may have, quite apart from its legislative 
responsibilities, a general oversight power, nor explore what the 
lawful reach of that power might be under the [Senate] 
Committee’s constituent resolution. Since passage of that 
resolution, the House Committee on the Judiciary has begun an 
inquiry into presidential impeachment. The investigative 
authority of the Judiciary Committee with respect to 
presidential conduct has an express constitutional source.219 
Importantly, that House Judiciary Committee eventually voted out 
articles of impeachment, one of which charged President Nixon with 
failing “to take care that the laws were faithfully executed.”220 
An impeachment proceeding, therefore, would present the 
clearest case for congressional standing to seek a declaratory 
judgment that a President’s nonenforcement of a statute was 
unlawful.221 The House Judiciary Committee would ask a court to rule 
 
 218. Id. at 732. 
 219. Id. 
 220. H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, IMPEACHMENT OF RICHARD M. NIXON, 
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. REP. NO. 93-1305, at 3 (1974). That committee 
stated that 
[h]e has failed to take care that the laws were faithfully executed by failing to act 
when he knew or had reason to know that his close subordinates endeavored to 
impede and frustrate lawful inquiries by duly constituted executive, judicial, and 
legislative entities concerning the unlawful entry into the headquarters of the 
Democratic National Committee, and the cover-up thereof, and concerning other 
unlawful activities including those relating to the confirmation of Richard 
Kleindienst as Attorney General of the United States, the electronic surveillance 
of private citizens, the break-in into the offices of Dr. Lewis Fielding, and the 
campaign financing practices of the Committee to Re-elect the President.  
Id. at 3–4. 
 221. Greene, supra note 207, at 591 (stating that “Congress could begin impeachment 
proceedings, or try to tie the President’s hands in other ways, but these are costly and 
complex and, more to the point, not directly responsive to the matter at hand. Why not get 
all three branches into the mix?”). Professor Greene sees the impeachment power as 
tangential to the concern of standing; I see it as fundamental. Because the House has the 
explicit constitutional power of impeachment, it has standing to seek a declaratory 
judgment that could be valuable in exercising that function, an interest apart from the 
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whether the President’s failure to enforce a law was arbitrary and 
capricious under administrative law standards, or discriminatory 
under a constitutional standard.222 
Rather than compelling the House Judiciary Committee to 
commence impeachment proceedings before granting standing for a 
declaratory judgment, a federal court could take cognizance of the 
fact that the impeachment power could extend to a failure to enforce 
a law as an instance of the President’s failure to take care that the 
laws be faithfully executed. That would create an “express 
constitutional source” for a declaratory judgment sought by the 
House.223 
The possibility of impeachment would, of course, raise concerns 
under the political question doctrine. A federal court would be 
strongly tempted to note that what constitutes “high [c]rimes and 
[m]isdemeanors”224 is constitutionally committed to another branch: 
the House of Representatives.225 That is true; but that is not what the 
House would be asking a federal court to determine. The court would 
be asked whether a particular instance of a President’s failure to act 
was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law,” under the long-settled jurisprudence of the 
 
generalized interest all citizens might have in the enforcement of a duly passed law. 
Professor Greene and I both conclude, however, that it is desirable to “get all three 
branches into the mix.” Id. 
  Similar to Professor Greene in seeing impeachment as separate from—as opposed 
to a premise—for congressional litigation, is Bethany Pickett who in her student note 
stated  
impeachment proceedings are an extreme remedy to presidential nonenforcement. 
Courts should not encourage impeachment “as a[] preferable alternative to a 
peaceful judicial determination of constitutional parameters.” Primarily, the 
President may be a popular president whose performance is exemplary in every 
other area. Judicial intervention is preferable to impeachment because it addresses 
the President’s particular area of wrongdoing, instead of broadly attacking the 
President and, in effect, throwing the baby out with the bathwater.  
Pickett, supra note 182, at 465 (footnotes omitted). 
 222. 5 U.S.C. §	706(2)(A) (2012) (setting out the arbitrary and capricious standard); 28 
U.S.C. §	1983 (2012) (establishing a right to bring suit for a violation of Constitutional 
rights). See supra Section IV.C. 
 223. See Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 
725, 732. (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc). 
 224. U.S. CONST. art. II, §	4. 
 225. Id. art. I, §	2, cl. 5. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (noting that “a 
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political 
department” is one of the factors on which a federal court should decline jurisdiction of a 
case under the political question doctrine). 
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Administrative Procedure Act,226 or violative of a constitutional right 
under §	1982 of the United States Code. If the President raised the 
defense that his inaction was necessary to avoid violating the 
Constitution, then the court would rule on that defense in the course 
of its judgment. Should a court decide against the President, the 
House of Representatives would decide whether the President’s 
failure to act constituted an impeachable offense. In doing so, the 
House can choose to base its decision on court rulings. For instance, 
the House could certainly take cognizance of a court decision reached 
in a lawsuit in which Congress was not a party. The House might have 
considered President Nixon’s impoundment of funds appropriated for 
New York City to be impeachable, based on the Supreme Court’s 
having held his action to be unlawful in Train v. City of New York.227 
Every federal court involved in Train, right up to the Supreme Court, 
knew that its holding might have been the basis for impeachment; but 
each issued a ruling nonetheless.228 What the House of 
Representatives might choose to do following a federal court ruling 
does not make the issue before the court a political question.  
Whether the House Judiciary Committee would proceed to 
consider impeachment in any given instance of executive nonaction 
would likely be informed by the President’s reaction to a declaratory 
judgment. The President might ignore the court’s ruling. However, he 
might instead use the occasion of a judicial ruling against him to 
reconsider and alter his behavior in some way. Whether such 
modified enforcement was sufficient or not would be within the 
judgment of the House Judiciary Committee. A superficial, 
minimalist, begrudging enforcement of a statute might not satisfy that 
committee—it would be hard for a court to make such a decision. 
How much enforcement is enough is not an easy determination for a 
court to make.229 It would, however, be an entirely appropriate 
political decision by the House Judiciary Committee. 
 
 226. 5 U.S.C. §	706(2)(A) (2012). “An action in a court of the United States	.	.	.	stating 
a claim that an agency or an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official 
capacity or under color of legal authority shall not be dismissed	.	.	.	that it is against the 
United States.” Id. §	702 (emphasis added). 
 227. Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 35 (1975). 
 228. In effect, that is also what the Supreme Court’s 8–0 opinion did in United States v. 
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). The Court could have dodged the case, asserting separation of 
powers and political question concerns, for instance. The result of that judicial nonaction 
would have been to leave the House without crucial evidence about possible wrongdoing, 
causing a bill of impeachment to proceed on speculation, if it proceeded at all. But the 
Court did rule, knowing the consequences. 
 229. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007); supra Section IV.B. 
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C. Summary of Legislative Standing to Challenge Nonenforcement 
The U.S. Supreme Court has most recently reaffirmed the 
requirements for standing in the following words: “A party has 
standing only if he shows that he has suffered an ‘injury in fact,’ that 
the injury is ‘fairly traceable’ to the conduct being challenged, and 
that the injury will likely be ‘redressed’ by a favorable decision.”230 
When a President fails to enforce a law, Congress should be able 
to challenge the inaction. The injury in fact is that congressional votes 
resulting in the passage of a law have been completely nullified.231 
Normal prosecutorial discretion is anticipated when Congress passes 
a law,232 so no injury is suffered by Congress through that practice. 
Undermining the structure of a law, however, does injure Congress. 
Years of administrative law jurisprudence has built up the means of 
distinguishing permissible agency discretion from action undermining 
a statute.233 The congressional resolution authorizing such a lawsuit 
shows that the current Congress maintains the interest it had in seeing 
put into effect the law that it (or a previous Congress) had passed.234 
 
 230. Wittman v. Personhuballah, 136 S. Ct. 1732, 1736 (2016) (citing Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (alteration in original). See Spokeo, 
Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016).  
 231. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939). 
 232. See III ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, supra note 109, §	17.1, at 1559. 
 233. Id. at §	17.2, at 1565–68. This distinction has been noted by a leading treatise:  
At least part of the solution to the problem of agency discretion must lie in judicial 
review of agency actions. The courts can confine agencies within constitutionally 
permissible boundaries to the extent that the Constitution provides justiciable 
standards. In the U.S. system of government, with policymaking power divided 
between separately elected Legislative and Executive Branches, the judiciary also 
is required to confine agency discretion within statutorily permissible 
boundaries.	.	.	.	Courts also can reduce the potential for agencies and agency 
employees to engage in selective exercise of discretionary power for arbitrary or 
impermissible purposes.  
See id. §	17.2, at 1565.  
  Choosing not to pursue a specific case is permissible, but choosing to ignore an 
entire category of behavior envisioned in the balance, which Congress wrote into a statute, 
would be impermissible. Creating prosecutorial priorities is permissible, ignoring a specific 
area of authority for rulemaking is not. See discussion supra Section IV.C. 
 234. See, e.g., H.R. Res. 676, 113th Cong. (2014) (enacted) (“Resolved, That the 
Speaker is authorized to initiate or intervene in one or more civil actions on behalf of the 
House of Representatives in a Federal court of competent jurisdiction to seek any 
appropriate relief regarding the failure of the President, the head of any department or 
agency, or any other officer or employee of the executive branch, to act in a manner 
consistent with that official’s duties under the Constitution and laws of the United States 
with respect to implementation of any provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act, title I or subtitle B of title II of the Health Care and Education Reconciliation 
Act of 2010, including any amendment made by such provision, or any other related 
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The first two prongs of the requirement of standing are thus met: 
there is injury in fact, and it is traceable to the President’s 
nonenforcement. 
As for the third prong of standing, a declaratory judgment 
against the President is “likely” to cause him to enforce the law, thus 
granting relief.235 This is especially true if the declaratory judgment is 
sought by the House, which has the authority to commence 
impeachment proceedings. An actual impeachment process should 
not need to have been initiated; the latent threat should be sufficient 
to convince a court that granting the requested declaratory judgment 
would be likely to bring relief. 
Dicta from the D.C. Circuit suggests that the House would suffer 
an additional kind of injury if it issued a subpoena to the President in 
aid of an investigation and the President refused to respond to it.236 
This kind of harm fits the category of institutional injury, beyond 
simply a desire to see duly enacted laws enforced. Two specific 
constitutional provisions add strength to the House’s standing: its 
impeachment role, and the President’s duty to take care that the laws 
be faithfully executed.237 A subpoena in aid of the House’s ability to 
judge the latter in the potential context of the former is a precise basis 
for standing. An analogy can be drawn between the desire of the 
House of Representatives, or the House Judiciary Committee, to 
obtain subpoenaed information, and the need of the House or the 
House Judiciary Committee for a declaratory judgment about the 
President’s nonenforcement of a law.238 
CONCLUSION 
Executive action in excess of constitutional authority can be 
checked in the courts. So also can executive nonaction. 
Where the President’s power is exclusive, the President, of 
course, may take action. Where the Congress’ power is exclusive, 
executive action can be enjoined, and executive nonaction is not 
logically a problem. Where the President and Congress share power, 
Congress can occupy the field and make independent executive action 
 
provision of law, including a failure to implement any such provision	.	.	.	.”). This law 
authorized the lawsuit in Burwell. See U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. 
Supp. 3d 53, 63 (D.D.C. 2015). 
 235. See supra note 229 and accompanying text. 
 236. Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 
727 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc). 
 237. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§	2–3, art II, §	3. 
 238. See supra notes 190–91 and accompanying text. 
95 N.C. L. REV. 553 (2017) 
2017] EXECUTIVE ACTION 605 
unlawful. Ambiguity as to whether Congress has done so can be 
diminished by explicit wording in laws to the effect that Congress 
intends to occupy the field, to the exclusion of executive action. 
Without such explicit language, a court must determine from the 
scheme of the legislation whether Congress intended its structure to 
be exclusive of executive action. If so, a court can enter an injunction 
against the executive action. 
If the President has failed to enforce a law passed by Congress, a 
court will be able to order relief where a plaintiff can identify a 
precise benefit to which they are entitled. A qui tam action can also 
force the collection of money owed to the government from a private 
party. In another narrow set of cases, a negative injunction will be 
available which, while not compelling executive action to enforce a 
law in the way a President does not wish to enforce it, will 
nevertheless enjoin his enforcing the law in other contexts where he 
does wish to enforce it. 
Outside of those instances, executive nonaction does not lend 
itself to judicial resolution by injunctive relief. A declaratory 
judgment, however, could be brought claiming that such nonaction 
was unlawful. That would provide a sufficiently concrete remedy 
because of the likelihood the President would adjust his behavior in 
the face of such a declaratory judgment. When the plaintiff is the 
House of Representatives, this is especially likely because of the 
House’s responsibility under the impeachment clause, even if an 
actual impeachment motion were not under active consideration. The 
House would have a further basis for standing in that a declaratory 
judgment would be directly relevant to its need to gather information 
in its constitutional function of impeachment.  
The cases on legislators’ standing would permit such a suit. The 
President can defend his nonenforcement on the grounds that the 
requested enforcement would be unconstitutional, or that his failure 
to enforce reflects no more than discretion operating under neutral 
principles (such as conserving scarce enforcement resources) that did 
not constitute an assault on the structure of the law passed by 
Congress. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
95 N.C. L. REV. 553 (2017) 
606 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95 
 
 
 
